

# DISCUSSION PAPER

**UNchanged:**

**Testing and comparing a United Nations  
reform proposal in a simulation  
environment**

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## Abstract

In the 75 years of its existence, there have been various plans to change the institutional design of the United Nations Security Council. However, no attempt has been made to qualitatively test these reform proposals. This paper outlines the innovative idea of simulating different decision-making regimes in a Model United Nations-like format. We tested an own proposal that envisages a Security Council with seven collective veto power holders against the actual Security Council with its five individual veto power holders. The results of the simulation and a post-simulation participant survey suggest that the proposed Council would not only be more legitimate but also more effective and efficient than the existing one. In order to substantiate these findings and fully explore the potential of Model United Nations as a research instrument, more such simulations should be conducted.

## 1. Introduction

Plans to change the institutional design of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are almost as old as the Council itself.<sup>1</sup> At the core of these reform proposals stands the perception of a deficit of legitimacy and effectiveness/efficiency of that body: With China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States holding a veto power that they frequently (threaten to) use to block resolutions from passing, the Council is said to enshrine outdated and distorted power relations and to lack decisive and timely responses to pressing issues.<sup>2</sup> Based on these shortcomings, academics, governments of aspiring nations and the United Nations (UN) themselves have produced numerous reform proposals. Whereas some proposals envisage an increase of the number of (non-)permanent seats while leaving the veto powers unchanged,<sup>3</sup> others seek to extend the veto,<sup>4</sup> redefine its scope,<sup>5</sup> or abolish it completely.<sup>6</sup>

The last and only successful reform of the Council dates back to 1965 when the number of non-permanent seats was increased from six to ten. Requiring a two-thirds majority in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the subsequent ratification of the then amended Charter by two-thirds of the member states, including the five veto powers, the hurdles for UNSC reform are set rather high. More fundamentally, though, there seems to be a trade-off between legitimacy – the representation of its membership – and effectiveness/efficiency – the ability to take decisive and timely action – itself.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For an in-depth analysis of UN reform proposals from 1945 to 2013, see L. Swart and E. Perry, *Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations. Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013*, New York: Center for UN Reform Education, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> D. Caron, 'The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', *American Journal of International Law* 87(4), 1993, 552-588; M. Mikhaitchenko, 'Reform of the Security Council and the Implications for Global Peace and Security', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 7(1), 2004; I. Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007; J. Morris and N. Wheeler, 'The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force', *International Politics*, 44, 2007, 214-231; M. Binder and M. Heupel, 'The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates', *International Studies Quarterly* 59(2), 2014, 238-250.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the proposals by Razali, the High-Level Panel, the Group of Four and the Uniting for Consensus group.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the proposals by the African Union, the Caribbean Community and the L69 group.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, B. Russett, B. O'Neill and J. Sutterlin, 'Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam', *Global Governance* 2(1), 1996, 65-80; K. Annan and G. H. Brundtland, 'Four Ideas for a Stronger U.N.' *New York Times*, 6 February 2015.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, M. Van Herpen, 'Security Council Reform: How and When?', *The National Interest*, 08 October 2003, <<https://nationalinterest.org/article/security-council-reform-how-and-when-2449>>, accessed 28 March 2020.

<sup>7</sup> N. Gardiner and B. D. Schaefer, 'U.N. Security Council Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest', *Backgrounder* 1873, 18 August 2005, 1-10; G. Hellmann und U. Roos, *Das deutsche Streben nach einem ständigen Sitz im UN-Sicherheitsrat: Analyse eines Irrwegs und Skizzen eines Auswegs*, INEF-Report 92, 2007, p. 30-32; E. C. Luck, 'Principal Organs' in T. G. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, Oxford

In our attempt to strike a balance between the two, we came up with our very own reform proposal, the Collective Veto Power UNSC, within which seven delegations shall hold a collective veto power (henceforth referred to as the C7 Council). When four or more of these delegations vote in the negative on a substantive question, it shall be denied passage. Thus, collective veto power-holding delegations require at least three other ones wishing to block the item under consideration to veto it compared to only one negative vote in the actual UNSC with its five individual veto power-holding delegations (commonly known as the P5 Council). In order to avoid over-representation of one ideological bloc amongst the collective veto power holders, we decided to feature three classically Western states/state collectives and three classically non-Western states. The seventh and final seat with a share of the collective veto power shall be held by the so-called “tie-breaker”. The seat of that tie-breaker shall be allocated to a country on the basis of a vote by the UNGA with repeatable two-year terms.

The hypothesis we sought to test was:

*The C7 Council is more effective and efficient in inducing coordinated responses to international crises than the P5 Council.*

A widely established method to measure the distributive and collective effects of a reformed UNSC is to conduct an *a priori* study of voting power.<sup>8</sup> While this “decidedly abstract” method allows us to “analyse the influence that each member state or regional group exerts on the decision-making process of the Security Council”, it is not able to model the decision-making process itself, failing to take into account informal aspects of bargaining and voting such as preferences, strategies, coalitions, pressures, threats, incentives, side-payments and “hidden vetoes”.<sup>9</sup> In the end, it “is the interaction between formal and more informal patterns of

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University Press, Oxford, 2008, 653-674, p. 660; B. Cox, ‘United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences’, *South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business* 6(1), 2009, 89-128; L. Swart, ‘Reform of the Security Council: 2007-2013’, in L. Swart and E. Perry (eds) *Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations. Reform of the Security Council from 1945 to September 2013*, Center for UN Reform Education, New York, 2013, 23-59, p. 46.

<sup>8</sup> G. Schwödiauer, ‘Calculation of A Priori Power Distributions for the United Nations’, Research Memorandum, 24. Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien, 1968; R. Junn and T.-W. Park, ‘Calculus of Voting Power in the UN Security Council’, *Social Science Quarterly* 58(1), 1977, 104-110; M. Hosli et al., ‘Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform’, *Review of International Organizations*, 6(2), 2011, 163-187; A. Volacu, ‘A Priori Voting Power Distribution Under Contemporary Security Council Reform Proposals’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21, 2018, 247-274.

<sup>9</sup> A. Volacu, ‘A Priori Voting Power Distribution Under Contemporary Security Council Reform Proposals’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21, 2018, 247-274, p. 248.

bargaining and voting that ... shape decision-making by the UN Security Council".<sup>10</sup> To better account for the informal aspects of the decision-making calculus, and, thereby, complement quantitative studies that focus on its formal aspects, we decided to compare the C7 Council against the P5 Council in a simulation environment.

Globally, there are hundreds of Model United Nations (MUN) every year during which students simulate the work of the United Nations.<sup>11</sup> While MUN-like simulations are widely accepted as a teaching tool,<sup>12</sup> they are not established as a research tool (yet). With the methodological toolbox of IR scholars being rather limited, said researchers are well-advised to explore the potential of human-based simulations to replicate social phenomena. This holds particularly true for future or hypothetical phenomena, such as a reformed UNSC, that cannot be adequately studied through historical or empirical analysis.<sup>13</sup> Following recent calls to treat simulations not only as didactic instruments, but also as quasi-experiments,<sup>14</sup> we simulated two Councils – one set up in line with our reform proposal, the other one governed by the actual voting rules – with MUN-experienced students of International Relations at Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences.

The paper is divided into four sections: After this introduction, we elaborate on the make-up of our reformed Council and the set-up of our conducted simulation. In the following section, we present the results of the simulation and a post-simulation participant survey. In the conclusion, we assess the performance of the two decision-making regimes and give recommendations for future research.

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<sup>10</sup> M. Hosli et al., 'Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform', *Review of International Organizations*, 6(2), 2011, 163-187, p. 172.

<sup>11</sup> N. S. Yossinger, 'What is Model UN? (And Why You Should Care?)', *eJournal USA* 16(12), 2012: 1-22.

<sup>12</sup> G. van Dyke, E. DeClair and P. Loedel, 'Stimulating Simulations: Making the European Union a Classroom Reality', *International Studies Perspectives* 1(2), 2000, 145-159; M. A. Boyer, 'Simulation in International Studies', *Simulation & Gaming* 42(6), 2011, 685-689; V. Asal, N. A. Kollars, C. Raymond and A.M. Rosen, 'Bringing Interactive Simulations into the Political Science Classroom', *Journal of Political Science Education* 9(2), 2013, 129-131.

<sup>13</sup> R. Lohmann, 'Taking a Glimpse into the Future by Playing?', *Simulation & Gaming* 50(3), 2019, 377-392.

<sup>14</sup> P. Guasti, W. Muno, and A. Niemann (2015). 'Introduction – EU Simulations as a Multi-Dimensional Resource: From Teaching and Learning Tool to Research Instrument', *European Political Science*, 14(3), 2015, 205-217; P. Rünz, 'Beyond Teaching: Measuring the Effect of EU Simulations on European Identity and Support of the EU', *European Political Science*, 14(3), 2015, 266-278.

## 2. Research Design

When we were faced with the selection of delegations for our reformed Council, we drew on other reform proposals and the actual Council. We decided to fill the three Western permanent seats with the United States of America, a shared European seat (under rotating leadership amongst the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and a shared Nordic seat (under the leadership of the Nordic Council), and the three non-Western permanent seats with the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India and the Russian Federation. The seventh seat with a share of the collective veto power, to be held by the so-called "tie-breaker", was allocated to the Republic of Costa Rica due to the country's legal international neutrality and lack of military capability. In order to have the most ideal testing conditions, we chose non-permanent delegations that were to the best possible extent identical to those in the actual Council. Accordingly, we decided to fill the non-permanent seats with the Republic of Singapore, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Republic of Ghana, the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Canada and the Argentine Republic (see annexe I).

After we had concluded the creation of our reformed Council, we started to think about the means of testing it. Since one cannot demand the real-world Council to change its composition and rules in accordance with our proposal for a while, we decided to measure the C7 Council against the P5 Council in a simulation environment. From 25 to 28 April 2019, we simulated the two Councils with 30 students of International Relations, with each student assuming the role of one delegation (see annexe II). The students were chosen out of a pool of applicants who have been vetted for previous MUN experience. All participants were supplied with a copy of the rules of procedure (see annexe III) and a study guide (see annexe IV) to ensure a common baseline of knowledge. Since the study sought to assess the reformed Council's capability to function in ways the actual Council fails to achieve coordinated efforts, we chose the crisis in Yemen as a negotiation scenario.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> After the overthrow of the Hadi government by Houthi rebels in 2015, Yemen plunged into civil war and soon became a battleground for a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The UN and other relief organizations estimate that in 2019, 80 per cent of the Yemeni population was in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Apart from the Stockholm Agreement on a cessation of hostilities in the city and ports of Hodeidah, and a subsequent UN mission to support that agreement, all UN-backed mediation efforts have failed so far.

Yet no matter how elaborate the preparations of the administrators of such a simulation may be, it will always remain just that – a simulation. There are certain aspects of deliberation and negotiation in the UN that cannot possibly be re-created in a MUN-like format. The delegates are students and not experienced career diplomats with a staff of civil servants keeping their back. Moreover, the feeling of being observed has a proven distortive effect on participants' behaviour. While the magnitude of these weaknesses could be reduced in follow-up simulations (see our recommendations in section four), it is not possible to eradicate them completely.

In order to draw firmer conclusions, we combined our simulation with a post-simulation participant survey. Although surveys have also been subject to critique, most notably that they deliver socially desirable results (a bias that simulations seem to be largely exempt from),<sup>16</sup> by asking our participants to reflect on their role in the simulation rather than to state their opinion about a sensitive issue, we sought to reduce that bias. Furthermore, by matching the returned answers of the survey with the observed behaviour in the simulation, we were able to control, to a certain extent, that what participants said was happening is what actually happened.

### 3. Results

We employed two analytical tools to compare the C7 Council against the P5 Council: An analysis of the outcome documents of the two simulated Councils and an assessment of a post-simulation participant questionnaire.

#### 3.1 Outcome Documents

In the following, we juxtapose the draft resolution of the P5 Council with the resolution of the C7 Council, as the former Council was not able to pass a resolution due to non-concurring votes cast by the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America (see annexe V).

The P5 Council worked on a draft resolution sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Besides the usual tone of

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<sup>16</sup> D.-J. Koch, 'NGOs – Cooperation and Competition: An Experimental Gaming Approach', *Simulation & Gaming* 42(6), 2011, 690-710, p. 704.



condemnation in the Preambulatory Clauses (PCs), the draft specifically recalls UNSC Resolutions 2368 (2017), 2462 (2019) and 2452 (2019). The former two introduce collective action in the fight against terrorism and the latter sets up the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), which sought to back the measures entailed in the Stockholm Agreement. In its Operative Clauses (OCs), the draft resolution acknowledges the need for humanitarian aid for Yemen, calls upon member states (which find themselves able to do so) to send unmanned aerial vehicles to fly into Yemen to dispatch said aid, emphasizes the need for a continuation of the peace talks under mediation of the UN, urgently appeals to involved parties to fulfil their commitments under the reached Stockholm Agreement, asks states to sign the Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen the protection of children in the conflict zone and, finally, reminds all states involved to observe international humanitarian law. Like most (draft) resolutions by the real-world UNSC on the situation in Yemen, this draft resolution does not implement sound action but rather reiterates previous achievements and invites states to join an effort.

The resolution passed by the C7 Council is substantially different. Its sponsors are the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica (the tie-breaker). In the PCs, there are noteworthy quantitative and qualitative differences: The resolution recalls a total of twelve former resolutions, e.g. UNSC Resolution 2251 (2012), which is a previous resolution on Yemen not outspokenly supportive of opposition forces, and 2216 (2015), which imposes an arms embargo against certain parties of the conflict. In its OCs, the resolution addresses a multitude of different issues ranging from humanitarian aid to counter-terrorism.<sup>17</sup> The creation of an “International Maritime Task Force for Yemen” (OC11), the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 16 (OC15), and the encouragement of the World Trade Organisation and the Council of Arab Economic Unity as possible institutions for further conflict resolution (OC16) indicate that contested items were not taken off the table due to the threat of a veto. What is remarkable is the sense for detail put into decisive action, in particular in OCs 1, 5-7, and 10 on remedying the humanitarian crisis, in OCs 12-16 on measures of post-crisis state-building and elections, and in OC 8 on concrete financial sanctions. Notably, the real-world UNSC tried to impose financial sanctions through its draft resolution S/2018/156 but was hindered to do so by a Russian veto. In sum, the resolution of the C7 Council entails

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<sup>17</sup> As raised by two delegates of the C7 Council in the questionnaire, they would have been able to include even more specific measures, especially on peacekeeping efforts, if they had had more time available.

more decisive action, is way more specific and was actually carried by the body compared to the draft resolution of the P5 Council.

### 3.2 Participant Questionnaire

We designed a post-simulation participant questionnaire with a total of 17 questions that, due to the temporary absence of four participants, was answered by 26 participants. The participants were asked to rate the accuracy of statements on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 meaning “not at all accurate” and 10 meaning “completely accurate”. The higher the average value returned, the more accurate the participants ruled a statement to be. The first part of the questionnaire asked participants to reflect on their role in the simulation, while the second part focused on the execution and organisation of the event. In this analysis, only the former will be considered (see annexe VI).

The first question asked the participants to grade the accuracy of the following statement: “I am able to identify interests and ideas of the country[/ies] I represented in the final (draft) resolution.” The P5 Council and the C7 Council returned on average a rating of 7.0 and 7.3, respectively. Despite the different decision-making regimes of the P5 and C7 Council, in both Councils a majority of participants were able to identify their delegations’ interests in the final (draft) resolution.

Since it is often claimed that the resolutions are at the mercy of each and every single veto power in the P5 Council,<sup>18</sup> the second question asked the participants for their perception of the veto powers’ blocking power over their proposals. The participants were asked to rate the accuracy of the following statement: “Many interests and ideas of the country[/ies] I represented were suppressed by a Permanent Member of the Security Council.” The average score returned for the C7 Council was 2.5. In contrast, with 5.2 the average score for the P5 Council was more than double that.

The third question asked the participants whether their proposals had been suppressed by another actor than a veto power-wielding delegation. The replies from the two Councils were

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<sup>18</sup> See, for example, M. Hosli et al., ‘Squaring the Circle? Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform’, *Review of International Organizations*, 6(2), 2011, 163-187, p. 172.

insignificantly different. On average, members of the P5 Council rated that question with 3.3 compared to 2.4 in the C7 Council. Therefore, the reform proposal did not significantly alter the power of non-permanent members in the eyes of the participants.

Insignificantly different was also the perceived importance of alliances with veto powers to have the delegation's proposals heard and added to the (draft) resolution. The C7 Council members returned on average a score of 6.7, leaning slightly towards a high importance of said partnerships. The P5 Council members rated the importance moderately less consequential with 6.5 as a mean. This result seems rather interesting since there is a contradiction in replies: Delegates reported a difference between the ability of veto power delegations to block proposals in the two Councils, but found alliances with veto powers almost equally important for their proposals to succeed. This might indicate that, although collective veto powers have a decreased blocking power, the constructive influence they have on items remains almost unchanged.

Another aspect we were interested in was the power of the tie-breaker in the C7 Council. The expectation was that the country in this seat would become close to a kingmaker. The C7 Council members rated that expectation to be neither very accurate nor inaccurate. The average rating given to the statement "The Tie Breaker (Costa Rica) was the most powerful actor in the Security Council" was 4.6, so just a few decimals below indifference. Very much noteworthy is the fact that the average value of accuracy returned by the participants representing the seven collective veto powers was even lower than that with 4.2, with which the participant representing the Republic of Costa Rica did not majorly disagree with.

The last question inquired directly into participants' opinion on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council they participated in. Delegates in the P5 Council ruled it to be medium-effective/efficient with a score of 4.8. In the C7 Council, delegates' judgement was different. They found it more effective and efficient in fulfilling its purpose with an average score of 7.1. Especially remarkable is the high share of delegates in the C7 Council who replied with scores of seven or higher. These participants make up closely 70 per cent of the interviewees from that Council. Even a majority of the collective veto powers fall into that group (compared to no individual veto powers in the P5 Council, noting the absence of a reply from the French delegation).

Summing up, the participants found the change in the institutional design of the UNSC to have had an effect on some aspects of its functioning but not on others. Contrary to our expectation, the reform proposal did not put the tie-breaker in a strong position of power over the Council's resolution. With regard to the distribution of power amongst member states in the two Councils, it seems evident that the veto powers in the P5 Council hold greater power over suppression of the proposals of others which seemed to have been different in the C7 Council. On the other hand, the participants did not rule alliances with veto powers any less important to their delegations' objectives being represented in the outcome document. Most importantly, the members of the C7 Council ruled the workings in that Council more effective and efficient, overall, than those of the P5 Council.

#### 4. Conclusion

Fully aware of the flaws and biases of a human-based simulation, we conclude that the method introduced and used in this paper is a promising one to test and measure different decision-making regimes against each other. The analysis of the outcome documents of the two simulated Councils and the assessment of the post-simulation participant survey suggest that our proposed C7 Council, which sees the veto power shared collectively by seven members in a fifteen-member Council, possesses not only greater legitimacy but also greater effectiveness and efficiency than the actual P5 Council. To fortify these findings, more simulations like these should be conducted. While we only considered the simulations' output, an observation of the negotiations and votes preceding it promises further valuable insights.

During the course of the study we encountered some weaknesses that could be rectified in future simulations. For one thing, our participants – all undergraduate students – could not be assumed to be as informed about the case at hand and the position of the country they represented as career diplomats from the respective countries. The gap between simulation and reality could be narrowed by recruiting (M)UN-experienced students and practitioners at postgraduate level that represent their country of origin. For another thing, the level of knowledge and skill differed substantially among our participants. While career diplomats may also be unequally qualified, they have civil servants behind them that conduct research, prepare sessions and transfer the sending government's interests. We thus recommend having not only one participant but a delegation of participants representing one country. Lastly, some of our participants were

temporarily absent due to conflicting study obligations. Although career diplomats also have to balance manifold obligations and commitments, their work in the UN usually is their professional focus. This problem, again, could be solved by creating a greater pool of participants and by introducing monetary compensation to generate a sense of obligation to remain part of the sessions for the duration of the simulation.

## Acknowledgements

We have only been able to conduct this study because of the financial support received from the Faculty of Society and Economics (dQVM) and the Faculty's Student Representative Council (FSR). The simulation would also not have taken place if there had not been participants. We would like to thank them for their time and interest. We owe a particularly great deal of gratitude to Jule K. Zeschky, who served as chairwoman on one of the two Councils.

## Annexes

### I. Composition of Councils

<b>P5 UNSC (actual)</b>	<b>C7 UNSC (UNchanged)</b>
People's Republic of China	People's Republic of China
French Republic	Republic of Costa Rica
Russian Federation	European Seat (FRA, GER, GB)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Republic of India
United States of America	Nordic Cooperation (DK, FIN, ISL, NOR, SWE)
Argentine Republic	Russian Federation
Republic of Costa Rica	United States of America
Federal Republic of Germany	Argentine Republic
Republic of Ghana	Commonwealth of Australia
Republic of India	Canada
Republic of Poland	Republic of Ghana
Republic of South Africa	Republic of Singapore
Kingdom of Sweden	Republic of South Africa
Republic of Uganda	Republic of Uganda
United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates
CHAIR(s)	CHAIR(s)

	Member without veto power		Member without veto power
	Member with individual veto power		Member with collective veto power

### II. Event Schedule

	<b>Thursday (25.04.)</b>	<b>Friday (26.04.)</b>	<b>Saturday (27.04.)</b>	<b>Sunday (28.04.)</b>
08.30 - 09.00		Chair Meeting <i>TBA</i>	Chair Meeting <i>TBA</i>	Chair Meeting <i>TBA</i>
09.00 - 10.00		Committee Session II  (Coffee Break incl.)	Committee Session IV  (Coffee Break incl.)	Committee Session VI  (Coffee Break incl.)
10.00 - 11.00				
11.00 - 12.00				
12.00 - 13.00		Lunch Break <i>Building 16</i>	Lunch Break <i>Building 1</i>	Lunch Break <i>Building 1</i>
13.00 - 14.00		Committee Session III  (Coffee Break incl.)	Committee Session V  (Coffee Break incl.)	Opening of Unchanged <i>TBA</i>
14.00 - 15.00	Opening of Unchanged <i>TBA</i>			
15.00 - 16.00	Committee Session I			
16.00 - 17.00				
17.00 - 18.00	(Coffee Break incl.)			
18.00 - 19.00				Sessions will take place in building 2 on the second floor

### III. Rules of Procedure



## RULES OF PROCEDURE

for UNChanged in 2019

by Max L. Liedtke and Niall J. Jansen

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#### Chapter 1: General Rules

##### (Rule 1) Scope

- (1) The Project UNChanged shall be run in accordance with these Rules of Procedure. They are applicable to all Members of Staff, the Delegations in every body of UNChanged during the conference, and all other Participants of UNChanged. These rules along with the rulings of the Secretary-General, the authorised Appointees, and the Committee Chairs/Presidents are final and binding. In situations not covered by these rules, the ruling of the Secretary-General and authorised Appointees will constitute the final authority.
- (2) These Rules of Procedure shall be considered adopted in advance of the session.
- (3) No other Rules of Procedure shall have authority over these.
- (4) The Charter of the United Nations of 1945 shall constitute a guideline to the overall character of UNChanged but may not take precedence over these Rules of Procedure or the judgement of the Secretary-General.

##### (Rule 2) Language

- (1) The official and working language of all bodies represented in UNChanged is English except otherwise provided by the Secretary-General (see Rule 7) or the Executive Council of UNChanged (see Rule 8).

##### (Rule 3) Courtesy

- (1) All Participants of UNChanged must show the appropriate respect for other Participants and Members of Staff both of UNChanged and the Rhein-Waal University of Applied Sciences.

##### (Rule 4) Dress code

- (1) All Participants of UNChanged shall dress appropriately according to western business attire or traditional business attire of the state they are going to represent in session.
- (2) The Ball of Delegates shall be a black-tie event requiring Participants to dress accordingly.

##### (Rule 5) Delegations

- (1) Each Delegate represents one member state or organisation of the respective Committee or Council unless provided otherwise by the Executive Council of UNChanged or the Secretary-General.

##### (Rule 6) Accredited Observers

- (1) Representatives of Accredited Observers have the same rights as those of Delegates of the Committee/Council except that
  - (a) they may not be sponsors of draft resolutions (though they may be signatories), and
  - (b) they may not participate in substantive voting (see Rule 55).
- (2) Representatives of states or organisations that are not accredited by the United Nations and/or UNChanged may only address the respective Committee/Council with prior approval by the respective Committee Chair/President.
- (3) Representatives of Accredited Observers are hereafter included in the term 'Delegate'.

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*(Rule 7) The Secretary-General (SecGen)*

- (1) The SecGen represents the final institution of interpretation of these rules. Their decisions and interpretations are binding to all Participants of UNchanged (including the Committee Chairs/Presidents, Delegations, Representatives, Members of Staff, and Guests). The SecGen shall not (if not absolutely necessary to do so) seek or receive instructions regarding ruling and interpretation of these rules from any authority outside UNchanged and the Rhein-Waal University of Applied Sciences.
- (2) The SecGen may at their discretion designate and introduce Appointees to act as their deputies, acting in their behalf, and bearing the powers and competencies of the SecGen.
- (3) Special Powers of the SecGen
  - (a) The SecGen may at any time make written or oral statements to a Committee/Council.
  - (b) If the SecGen enters a Committee/Council in session, the Committee Chairs/Presidents shall immediately announce the presence of the SecGen or their authorised Appointee to the Committee/Council. All members of the Committee/Council shall then rise and remain silent. The floor is immediately and automatically yielded to the SecGen or person acting on their behalf. The interrupted speaker shall have the opportunity to be compensated by for example added speaking time.
  - (c) The SecGen may at any time in session add any item to the agenda of any Committee/Council.

*(Rule 8) The Committee Chairs/Presidents*

- (1) Each Committee and Council shall be chaired by at least two Committee Chairs or Presidents (in the case of the Security Council) with equal rights and authority though they may decide to take two different roles during session, the Presiding Officer and the Secretary. (The descriptions of duties and rights in Rule 8 (3) are of suggestive nature only and subject to change by the Committee Chairs/Presidents.)
- (2) The Committee Chairs/Presidents are responsible to and only to the Secretary-General and remain under the authority of these Rules of Procedure.
- (3) The Presiding Officer
  - (a) maintains order (see Rule 61) and a productive and constructive atmosphere in the meeting and in debate,
  - (b) opens and closes each meeting of the session,
  - (c) directs the debates of the Committee/Council,
  - (d) recognises Speakers for participation in debate,
  - (e) assigns the right to speak and withdraws it if necessary,
  - (f) puts questions to vote,
  - (g) conducts voting (procedural and substantive),
  - (h) announces results of such votes,
  - (i) and rules on Points and Motions;
  - (j) may rule Points and Motions out of order or dilatory,
  - (k) may at any time ask the Committee/Council to "stand at ease" in order to briefly consult with their Secretary,
  - (l) may use a gavel or a substitute of comparative kind in order to maintain order,

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- (3) For substantive voting, at least the majority of Members of the Committee/Council must be present.
- (4) The presence of a quorum shall be assumed as given unless specifically challenged by a Point of Order (see Rule 24) and proven to no longer be given.

*(Rule 13) Roll Call*

- (1) During Roll Call, the Secretary of the Committee/Council shall read the English names of all Delegations in alphabetical order. After being called, the Delegations may answer in either of the two following ways:
  - (a) Present:  
By stating "Present", Delegations indicate their presence. They may abstain from substantial voting as usual.
  - (b) Present and Voting:  
By stating "Present and Voting", Delegations indicate their presence but also do they bindingly express their wish to not abstain from substantial voting. This Decision can be used to express the issues on the agenda to be of especially pressing nature for the respective Delegation.

*Chapter 3: Debate*

*(Rule 14) Agenda for Debate*

- (1) A provisional agenda for debate shall be drawn up by the Executive Council.
- (2) At the beginning of the first Committee/Council session, there shall be a debate of limited time on setting the agenda. The Committee/Council shall debate the order of topics on the agenda. The debate may only include those topics listed in the provisional agenda by the EC unless otherwise provided by the SecGen or the EC.
- (3) At any point of debate, any Delegate may introduce a Motion to Set the Agenda (see Rule 34) which then has to be voted upon immediately.
- (4) The Chairs shall limit the time available for debate on the agenda. After the allotted time for debate has elapsed with no Motion to Set the Agenda having been introduced (in accordance with Rule 14 (3)), the Chairs may set the agenda. Same applies if a Motion to Adjourn the Debate (see Rule 36) passes or the list of speakers at some point of debate exhausts.

*(Rule 15) List of Speakers*

- (1) After the agenda has been set (in accordance with Rule 14), the Chairs shall set up a General List of Speakers (GLS) on the next item of debate for the purpose of general debate. Additional Speakers may be added to the GLS by the Chairs when indicating their wish to be added by raising their placard.
- (2) At any time, Delegates may request the Chairs to add/remove them from the GLS in writing also.
- (3) The Chairs shall add Speakers to the GLS in the order in which they indicated their wish to be added.
- (4) Speakers may not be added twice on the GLS directly subsequently unless provided otherwise by the Chairs.

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- (m) may transfer their duties and rights to a designated deputy and with consent of the Secretary-General to other Members Staff,
  - (n) may in session be addressed by Participants as "Madam/Mr Chair(-woman/-man/-person)", "Mr/Madam Presiding Officer", and "Madam/Mr President" (the latest to be used in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council only).
- (4) The Secretary of the Committee/Vice-President of the Council:
- (a) supports the Presiding Officer in session,
  - (b) maintains a List of Speakers,
  - (c) deals with and answers written inquiries by Members of the Committee/Council,
  - (d) conducts Roll Calls,
  - (e) approves or denies approval of submitted amendments,
  - (f) may in session be addressed by Participants as "Madam/Mr Secretary", "Madam/Mr Vice-President" (in the case of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council only), and "Mr/Madam Deputy".

*(Rule 9) The Executive Council of UNchanged (EC)*

- (1) In the EC, the students that chaired the organisation of the conference are represented.
- (2) In session, Members of the EC do not per se have any special powers and competencies except for those of advisory and administrative nature.
- (3) With respect to administrative issues, decisions of Members of the EC are binding and need to be followed by Participants of UNchanged.

*(Rule 10) Guests*

- (1) Sessions of all Committees and Councils are held in public. Guests are welcome to observe the work done and debates held in session. They are allowed to orally submit questions regarding parliamentary procedure to the Secretary of the Committee/Council. At no point, they are allowed to raise a Point or Motion. Other than that, they are not allowed to address the Committee/Council without prior approval of the Chairs.

*Chapter 2: Session*

*(Rule 11) Punctuality*

- (1) All Participants of UNchanged shall be on time for every session as scheduled. Should they not comply with this rule, the Chairs may set appropriate consequences.
- (2) When arriving late (after the Roll Call at the beginning of session began), the Participant shall after entering the room of assembly in a quiet and nondisruptive manner remain standing close to the door. The Chair shall when appropriate invite the respective Participant to take their seat and apologise in writing to the Chair for being late. After this procedure is completed, the Chair shall announce the presence of that Participant to the Committee/Council and adopt the given quorum and majorities accordingly.

*(Rule 12) Quorum*

- (1) Presence shall be determined by a Roll Call executed by the Secretary of the Committee/Council (see Rule 13).
- (2) For debate, the Presiding Officer declares a Committee/Council session open and permits debate to proceed when at least one-quarter of Members of the Committee/Council are present.

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- (5) The time granted each individual Speaker on the GLS may be altered by majority vote (see Rule 32).
- (6) The GLS may be closed for further admission by majority vote (see Rules 40).

*(Rule 16) Speeches*

- (1) No Delegate/Participant/Guest may address the Committee/Council without prior approval of the Chair which may at any time be withdrawn.
- (2) Speaking time for individual Speakers shall be determined either by the Chairs or majority votes (see Rule 32). Five to ten seconds before the Speaker's time elapses, the Chair may indicate so by taping the gavel once. Once the time has elapsed, the Chair shall withdraw the Speaker's floor and call upon the next Speaker.
- (3) The Chair may call a Delegate to Order if their remarks are not on the issue under debate (see Rule 61 (2)).
- (4) No other Participant (other than the SecGen and the Chairs) may interrupt a Speaker except for raising Incidental Points and Motions (see Rule 18 (4)(b)).
- (5) Delegates are strictly prohibited from showing visible and/or audible signs of (dis-) approval during or after a speech except for knocking on the table twice in a non-majority disruptive manner after a Speaker has completed their remarks.
- (6) All kinds of cross-talking or other interjections are strictly prohibited in Formal Debate and shall be sanctioned by the Chairs in accordance with Rule 61.

*(Rule 17) Yields*

- (1) A Speaker granted the right to speak on a substantial matter (see Rule 54) during General/Formal Debate may yield unused and remaining speaking time in either of the following ways:
  - (a) Yields to Another Delegate:  
The Speaker's remaining time will be offered to another Delegate of that Committee/Council. If the respective Delegate accepts this yield, the Chair shall recognise them to speak.
  - (b) Yields to Questions:  
Delegates will have the opportunity to be recognised by the Chair to ask questions to the previous Speaker. Questions are usually limited to one question per Delegate but follow-up questions may be entertained by the Chair when a Motion to Follow-Up has been raised by the previous questioner immediately after hearing the Speaker's answer to their previous question.  
The Chair may rule any question out of order that they deem rhetorical, leading, and/or not primarily designed to gain information. The Chairs have the right to sanction misconduct in accordance with Rule 61.  
Only the Speaker's answers to questions will be counted towards the remaining speaking time.
  - (c) Yields to the Chair/President:  
Such a yield should be performed by any Speaker who does not seek to use their remaining speaking time in any of the prementioned ways. The Chair will then move onto the next Speaker.
- (2) More than one yield per Speaker is prohibited. Any further yield of time is out of order and shall not be entertained by the Chair.

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- (3) Yielding time when speaking on a procedural matter (see Rule 54) is out of order and shall not be entertained by the Chair.
- (4) If a Speaker has not yielded their remaining time, this will be considered as a Yield to the Chair/President (see Rule 17 (1)(c)).

#### Chapter 4: General Rules Regarding Points and Motions

##### (Rule 18) General Facts

- (1) Formal Debate may be interrupted by Points and Motions stated/introduced by Delegates of that Committee/Council. Only those listed in Chapters 5 and 6 shall be entertained by the Chairs unless provided otherwise by the SecGen, the EC, or the Chairs of that Committee/Council.
- (2) Unless otherwise provided by the SecGen, the EC, or the Chairs of that Committee/Council when wishing to introduce a General Point/Motion (see Rule 18 (4)(a)), Delegates shall raise their point-motion-placard (facing the Chairs with the kind of issue the Delegate wishes to introduce) but shall remain seated until recognised by the Chair.  
When wishing to introduce an Incidental Point (see Rule 18 (4)(b)), the Delegate shall rise to their feet and also raise their point-motion-placard (facing the Chairs with the kind of issue the Delegate wishes to introduce) but shall remain silent until recognised by the Chair.
- (3) The Chair shall recognise those Delegates to explain the kind of Point/Motion they wish to introduce and determine precedence in accordance with Rule 19.
- (4) There are two kinds of Points and Motions to be distinguished:
  - (a) General Points/Motions:  
General Points and Motions may not interrupt a Speaker. This type includes every Point and Motion not listed under Rule 18 (4)(b).
  - (b) Incidental Points:  
Incidental Points may interrupt a Speaker when necessary. This class of Points and Motions includes and only includes:
    - (i) Point of Personal Privilege (see Rule 21), and
    - (ii) Point of Order directly referring to the recent Speech (see Rule 22).

##### (Rule 19) Precedence

- (1) Some Points and Motions shall have precedence over others and shall be dealt with first.
- (2) When in debate, the Chairs shall determine precedence in accordance with the following list (of decreasing precedence):
  - (i) Point of Personal Privilege
  - (ii) Point of Order
  - (iii) Point of Parliamentary Inquiry
  - (iv) Right of Reply
  - (v) Point of Information to the Delegate
  - (vi) Motion to Follow-Up
  - (vii) Motion for a Minute of Silent Prayer/Meditation
  - (viii) Motion to Appeal the Decision of the Chair
  - (ix) Motion to Suspend the Meeting

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- (3) Due to high urgency, this Point is considered an Incidental Point and may interrupt a Speaker (see Rule 18 (4)(b)).

##### (Rule 23) Point of Parliamentary Inquiry

- (1) During discussion of any matter, Delegates may raise a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to ask the Chair a question regarding the Rules of Procedure and to settle any uncertainties regarding those rules.
- (2) Delegates are strictly prohibited from using a Point of Parliamentary Inquiry to debate the content under debate rather than a substantial breach of these rules.

##### (Rule 24) Right of Reply

- (1) If a Delegate infringes upon the sovereignty or integrity of another Delegate or another Country in their speech, the concerned Delegate may raise a Right of Reply. If the Chair grants a Right of Reply, the requesting Delegate will obtain appropriate speaking time to answer to the statement of the previous Speaker. The Chair shall limit the time for such statements to an amount between 30 and 90 seconds.
- (2) Unless the reason for the request is obvious, the Chair shall ask the requesting Delegate to explain why a Right of Reply is needed.

##### (Rule 25) Point of Information to the Delegate

- (1) After another Delegate's speech during General Debate, a Delegate may raise a Point of Information to the Delegate to ask the Delegate for clarifications regarding their speech.
- (2) It is at the discretion of the Chair to authorise such a Point of Information to the Delegate.
- (3) Points of Information (to the delegate) must be worded as a simple question and not be used as a statement on the substance of the matter under discussion. In cases of misconduct, the Chair shall immediately withdraw the under Rule 25 (2) granted authorisation and may sanction the Delegate's misbehaviour in accordance with Rule 61.

#### Chapter 6: Rules Regarding Motions

##### (Rule 26) General Rules regarding Motions

- (1) If a Motion is considered 'debatable', the Chair shall grant the floor to a number of Delegates, specified in the specific Rule on that Motion, to speak in favour of and against the Motion as such. If not further specified the number of speakers shall be limited to two in favour of and two against the Motion under consideration. The time for such statements shall be 30 seconds per Speaker if not provided otherwise by the Chairs.
- (2) If no Delegate wishes to speak in favour of a debatable Motion, the Motion immediately fails to pass without a vote. In no delegate wishes to speak against a debatable Motion, the Motion immediately passes and is carried without a vote.

##### (Rule 27) Withdrawal of Motions

- (1) Any Motion may be withdrawn by its Mover at any point of debate but before the voting procedure upon that Motion has begun. A Motion withdrawn may be re-introduced by any other Delegate.

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- (x) Motion to Extend/Limit the Individual Speaker's Time
- (xi) Motion to Adjourn/Resume the Debate
- (xii) Motion to Suspend Formal Debate
- (xiii) Motion to Set the Agenda
- (xiv) Motion to Adjourn the Meeting
- (xv) Motion to Rescind
- (xvi) Motion to Amend the Draft Resolution
- (xvii) Motion to Call the Previous Question
- (xviii) Motion to Close/Re-Open the List of Speakers

- (3) When in voting procedure, the Chairs shall determine precedence in accordance with the following list (of decreasing precedence):
  - (i) Point of Personal Privilege
  - (ii) Point of Order
  - (iii) Point of Parliamentary Inquiry
  - (iv) Motion to Adapt by Acclamation
  - (v) Motion to Divide the Question
  - (vi) Motion to Vote on a Draft Resolution by Paragraphs
  - (vii) Motion to Divide the House
- (4) If Motions containing different durations of Moderated or Unmoderated Caucus (see Rule 33) arise, the Motion with the longest duration takes precedence because it is most disruptive to Formal Debate. A Motion to extend the previously elapsed Caucus shall always take precedence over a Motion introducing a new Caucus of any kind.
- (5) No Motion shall require to be seconded in order to be recognised.
- (6) Objections are out of order unless the Chair specifically asks for objections.

##### (Rule 20) Ruling out of order/dilatory

- (1) The Chairs may rule any Point or Motion out of order because they deem it dilatory or unnecessarily disruptive to flow of debate.

#### Chapter 5: Rules Regarding Points

##### (Rule 21) Point of Personal Privilege

- (1) Whenever Delegates experience personal discomfort that impairs their ability to participate in the proceedings (e.g. problems with audibility, air conditioning etc.), they may rise to a Point of Personal Privilege, in order to request that the discomfort be corrected.
- (2) Due to high urgency, this Point is considered an Incidental Point and may interrupt a Speaker (see Rule 18 (4)(b)).

##### (Rule 22) Point of Order

- (1) During the discussion of any matter, Delegates may raise a Point of Order to complain about an instance of improper parliamentary procedure. The Point of Order shall be immediately ruled upon by the Chair in accordance with these Rules of Procedure.
- (2) Delegates are strictly prohibited from using a Point of Order to debate the content under debate rather than a substantial breach of these rules.

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- (2) Once a Motion has been passed, all other raised Motions at that point are automatically withdrawn and can be re-introduced at the discretion of the Chairs.

##### (Rule 28) Motion to Follow-Up

- (1) This Motion refers to Rule 17 (1)(b). It may only be moved in such described circumstances.
- (2) This Motion is non-debatable and subject to the Chair's discretion.

##### (Rule 29) Motion for a Minute of Silent Prayer/Meditation

- (1) Any Delegate may move for a Minute of Silent Prayer/Meditation. The Mover may decide to name a specific reason for their request.
- (2) Upon passage, the Chairs shall instruct the Committee/Council accordingly.
- (3) This Motion is non-debatable and subject to the Chair's discretion.

##### (Rule 30) Motion to Appeal the Decision of the Chair

- (1) A Delegate may Appeal the Decision of the Chair. If this motion is carried, the Chair should alter their previous ruling according to the appeal. If this motion fails to pass, the Chair's decision shall sustain.
- (2) Any decisions concerning any of the following Motions are not subject to appeal:
  - (i) Motion for a Minute of Silent Prayer/Meditation,
  - (ii) Motion to Adjourn the Meeting, and
  - (iii) Right of Reply.
- (3) An appeal cannot be directed against any procedural regulation contained in these rules.
- (4) This Motion is non-debatable and requires a two-thirds majority vote to pass.

##### (Rule 31) Motion to Suspend the Meeting

- (1) Plenary meetings can be paused for a predetermined time (suspension).
- (2) The Chair may Suspend the Meeting at their discretion, particularly with regard to the programme of events (e.g. Lunch Breaks) provided for by UNchanged.
- (3) Any Motion to Suspend the Meeting is non-debatable and requires a simple majority vote to pass.

##### (Rule 32) Motion to Extend/Limit the Individual Speaker's Time

- (1) The Individual Speaker's Time shall be 60 seconds per speaker at the beginning of the debate, on agenda setting, and on each agenda item.
- (2) A Delegate may move to Extend/Limit the Speaker's Time to a specific amount of time.
- (3) The Individual Speaker's Time may not be set to unlimited and not to fewer than 30 seconds per Speaker.
- (4) In case of multiple Motions Extend/Limit the Individual Speaker's Time, the Motion containing the longest proposed Individual Speaker's Time shall take precedence.
- (5) This Motion is debatable to the extent of one Speaker in favour and one against the Motion, and requires a simple majority vote to pass.

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*(Rule 33) Motions to Suspend Formal Debate*

- (1) Delegates may move to Suspend Formal Debate in order to put Formal Debate (including the General Speakers List) on hold and continue the plenary meeting in either of the following two ways:
  - (i) Unmoderated Caucus:

The purpose of an unmoderated caucus is to allow immediate and informal negotiations in order to clarify positions, and frame amendments or draft resolutions.

For the duration of an Unmoderated Caucus, formal rules shall be suspended.

During Unmoderated Caucus, Delegates may move freely in the room of meeting.

When moving for an Unmoderated Caucus, the Mover shall specify the overall duration for Caucus.
  - (ii) Moderated Caucus:

The purpose of a Moderated Caucus is to facilitate substantive debate to discuss specific issues more flexibly than in Formal Debate.

For its duration, the Chair shall depart from the General List of Speakers and admit Delegates to the floor at their discretion.

The only points that shall be in order during Moderated Caucus are:

    - Point of Personal Privilege,
    - Point of Parliamentary Inquiry,
    - The Right of Reply, and
    - Point of Order.

When moving for a Moderated Caucus, the Mover shall specify the overall duration, the Individual Speaker's Time, and the Topic for that Caucus.

The Moderated Caucus immediately elapses when there are no further admissions for the floor (no further Delegates wishing to speak).
- (2) A Caucus shall begin upon passage of the Motion introducing the Caucus and shall end after the specified time has elapsed or upon notice of the Chairs.
- (3) The precedence of multiple Motions for Caucus is defined in Rule 19 (4).
- (4) Such a Motion to Suspend Formal Debate is debatable to the extent of one Speaker in favour of and one against the Motion, and requires a simple majority vote to pass.
- (5) Extension of (Un-) Moderated Caucus:

Such a Motion to Extend the (Un-) Moderated Caucus shall be in order immediately after the original Caucus has elapsed.

The Mover shall in their Motion specify the amount of time for which they wish to extend the Caucus. This time shall not exceed the overall time for the original Caucus. It is within the Discretion of the Chair to rule consecutive extensions out of order.

This Motion is non-debatable and requires a simple majority vote to pass.

*(Rule 34) Motion to Set the Agenda*

- (1) Any delegate may bring in a motion to set the agenda during agenda setting. The delegate moving this motion shall specify a proposed agenda order.
- (2) In case of multiple motions to set the agenda, the motions shall be voted upon in the order in which they were brought to the floor.

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*(Rule 40) Motion to Close/Re-open the List of Speakers*

- (1) A Delegate may move to Close an open List of Speakers during Formal Debate. No Member may be added to a closed List of Speakers.
- (2) This Motion shall have no effect on Members currently on the List of Speakers at the time of the adoption of such Motion.
- (3) A Delegate may move to Re-open a closed List of Speakers during Formal Debate.
- (4) These Motions are non-debatable and require a simple majority to pass.

*(Rule 41) Motion to Adapt by Acclamation*

- (1) This Motion may be moved before the Committee/Council moves into voting procedure upon a matter but only after those opposing the matter have had a chance to speak.
- (2) Upon passage, this issue under consideration passes/gets resolved in the affirmative without voting.
- (3) This motion is non-debatable and requires unanimity. The Chair may ask for any objections when considering this Motion.

*(Rule 42) Motion to Divide the Question*

- (1) This Motion only applies when in voting procedure.
- (2) The Mover shall when moving this Motion specify on how to divide the question.
- (3) Upon passage, this Motion requires to split the question under consideration into parts that are then to be voted upon separately.
- (4) This Motion is non-debatable and requires a simple majority to pass.

*(Rule 43) Motion to Vote on a Draft Resolution by Paragraphs*

- (1) This Motion only applies when voting upon a Draft Resolution's passage.
- (2) Upon passage, this Motion requires to split the question under consideration and vote upon the Preambulatory Clauses en bloc and upon each Operative Clause of a Draft Resolution separately.
- (3) This Motion is debatable to the extent of one Speaker in favour of and one against the Motion, and requires a simple majority to pass.

*(Rule 44) Motion to Divide the House*

- (1) This Motion only applies when voting upon substantial matters or when repeated voting procedures have failed to yield a sufficient result.
- (2) Upon passage, this Motion requires the Committee/Council to not vote by raising placards but by roll call. All Countries will be called out by the Secretary of the Committee/Council in alphabetical order of their English names. When being called, the Delegation of the respective Country shall answer either with "Aye" (in favour of), "Nay" (against), or "Abstaining" (not voting).
- (3) This Motion is non-debatable and need not be voted upon.

Chapter 7: Rules Regarding Working Papers and Draft Resolutions

*(Rule 45) Working Papers*

- (1) A Working Paper is a document written by Delegates, in which they formulate ideas for inclusion in later Draft Resolutions, for which it may serve as a basis. In order to have it

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- (3) If a motion to set the agenda passes, the agenda shall remain set that way and further motions to set the agenda shall not be voted upon.
- (4) This Motion is debatable to the extent of two Speakers in favour of and two against the Motion, and requires a simple majority vote to pass.

*(Rule 35) Motion to Adjourn the Meeting*

- (1) Plenary meetings can be closed for the remaining time of the conference (adjournment). A motion to adjourn the meeting is not debatable, requires a simple majority, and will only be allowed at, or near the very end of scheduled Committee/Council sessions on the last day of the conference.

*(Rule 36) Motion to Adjourn/Resume the Debate*

- (1) Debate on an agenda item can be adjourned. As long as adjourned, no Delegate shall refer to the affected matter other than by moving resumption of debate thereof.
- (2) Both the Motion to Adjourn the Debate and the Motion to Resume the Debate are debatable to the extent of two Speakers in favour of and two against the Motion, and require a simple majority vote to pass.

*(Rule 37) Motion to Rescind*

- (1) By moving this Motion, the respective Delegate seeks to re-introduce a Draft Resolution or Amendment that the Committee/Council previously failed to pass.
- (2) Upon passage, the Committee/Council may re-debate this issue. The Draft Resolution/Amendment is not automatically accepted by the Committee/Council upon passage of the Motion to Rescind.
- (3) The Further use of this Motion is explained in Rule 53.
- (4) The Motion is debatable to the extent explained in Rule 53, and requires a two-thirds majority to pass.

*(Rule 38) Motion to Amend the Draft Resolution*

- (1) This Motion is only then in order when a Draft Resolution has been introduced to the Committee/Council.
- (2) The further use of this Motion is explained in Rule 50.
- (3) The Motion is debatable to the extent explained in Rule 50, and requires a simple majority to pass.

*(Rule 39) Motion to Call the Previous Question*

- (1) This Motion upon passage ends debate on the issue under consideration and moves the Committee/Council immediately into voting upon that issue.
- (2) If the Motion to Call the Previous Question is passed when debating a substantial matter, the Committee/Council immediately ends debate on that issue and moves into substantial voting upon all available draft resolutions.
- (3) This Motion is debatable to the extent of two Speakers in favour of and two against the Motion, and requires a two-thirds majority vote to pass.

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accepted as a Draft Resolution, delegates are required to submit the Working Paper to the Chair prior to voting procedure.

- (2) A Working Paper shall have at least one Preambulatory Clause (hereafter: PC) and one Operative Clause (OC).
- (3) Any PCs or OCs not beginning with any of the available Introductory Phrases (see Annex) shall be ruled out of order and may not be passed to become part of a Draft Resolution.
- (4) The number of submitted Working Papers per issue on the agenda is generally unlimited, although the Chairs shall expect the Delegates to merge Working Papers where possible.
- (5) When submitted, the Working Paper shall be examined by the Chairs concerning style, form, the use of technical terms, and the number of Sponsors and Signatories.
- (6) The Chairs may advise the Sponsors to adapt the Working Paper in certain ways. They are able to correct obvious mistakes in spelling and grammar.
- (7) The Chairs shall refuse the introduction of a Working Paper if it exceeds the competencies of the Committee/Council or clearly violates the UN Charter.

*(Rule 46) Draft Resolutions*

- (1) A Working Paper becomes a Draft Resolution as soon as it has received the approval of the Chair. A Draft Resolution shall be made available to all Delegates by distributing copies, or by other appropriate means. After distribution, it shall be read out to the Committee/Council by one of the Sponsors.
- (2) A Draft Resolution shall have at least one Preambulatory Clause (hereafter: PC) and one Operative Clause (OC).
- (3) Any PCs or OCs not beginning with any of the available Introductory Phrases (see Annex) shall be ruled out of order and may not be passed to become part of a Resolution.
- (4) A Draft Resolution is considered property of the whole Committee/Council and may only be withdrawn with the unanimous consent of all Sponsors and Signatories.
- (5) A Draft Resolution is adopted as a Resolution as soon as a substantial vote on its entire content passes.
- (6) The number of Resolutions per issue on the agenda shall not be limited by these Rules of Procedure.

*(Rule 47) Sponsors and Signatories*

- (1) For a Working Paper to be approved by the Chairs as a Draft Resolution, there have to be at least two Sponsors (the authors of that Working Paper) and four Signatories (Delegates supporting the issues being discussed but not necessarily support the content itself). In the Security Council, the number of necessary Signatories shall be three.
- (2) When there are competing Working Papers on the same issue on the Agenda, a Delegate may only be Signatory to one of those Working Papers.

Chapter 8: Rules Regarding Amendments

*(Rule 48) General Facts*

- (1) Delegates may amend (change) the text of the Operative Clauses of a Draft Resolution introduced to the Committee/Council. An Amendment may seek to add to, delete from, or change parts of those OCs. It may also seek to change multiple OCs in one Amendment.

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- (2) An Amendment seeking to amend a previously amended part of the Draft Resolution shall be in order.
- (3) Once formally introduced, an Amendment may not be withdrawn but only voted down by the Committee/Council when being considered in voting.

*(Rule 49) Submission of Amendments*

- (1) An Amendment may only be submitted in written form to the Chairs. When appropriate concerning style, form, spelling, and grammar, the Chairs shall introduce it to the Committee/Council for consideration. The approval may not be denied upon concerns regarding the mere content of the Amendment.
- (2) The writing submitted to the Chairs shall include the name of the Sponsor of that Amendment, the specific OC it seeks to amend, and the specific changes it seeks to make.
- (3) After approval of the Amendment by the Chairs, the Chairs shall indicate the Sponsor of that Amendment that it has been approved by the Chairs and that the Sponsor of the Amendment may now move its introduction to the Committee/Council.

*(Rule 50) Introduction of Amendments*

- (1) The Introduction of the Amendment requires a formal Motion to Amend the Draft Resolution to be moved by the Sponsor of that Amendment.
- (2) After approval and before debate, the Chairs shall read the Amendment out to the Committee and when possible display the Amendment to the Committee/Council.

*(Rule 51) Debate on Amendments*

- (1) First, the Chairs shall set time for the overall debate of that Amendment and set an Individual Speaker's Time. The overall time for debate on one Amendment shall not exceed 20 minutes and not be less than 6 minutes.
- (2) The Sponsor of that Amendment shall have the right to speak first or last on that Amendment. The Sponsor shall indicate their preference to the Chairs.
- (3) The first Speaker in the Debate on the Amendment shall speak in favour of the Amendment. After that, the Chairs shall call upon Speakers in favour of and against the Amendment alternately. When the Speakers for one of the argument's sides have elapsed, the Chair may call upon anyone to take the floor.
- (4) When the time only allows one further Speaker and the Sponsor has decided to speak last on their Amendment, the Chairs shall call them to speak. When the Sponsor decides to go last, they have the right to speak for the full amount of the previously set Individual Speaker's Time even if time should constrain before that amount of time has passed.
- (5) When there should be no further Speakers wishing to speak, the Amendment should be put to a vote.
- (6) If no Delegate wishes to speak against the Amendment as proposed, the Motion immediately passes and the changes apply to the Draft Resolution without a vote.
- (7) Delegates may move to end debate and Call the Previous Question in accordance with Rule 39.
- (8) A proposed Amendment (if not friendly) requires a simple majority to pass.

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- (5) During Procedural Voting, the Chairs are not required to count the votes if they deem there to be a clear majority for one of the sides of the question. During Substantial Voting they shall count the votes to be able to announce an exact result of the vote.

*(Rule 57) Conduct during Voting*

- (1) Only the following Points and Motions shall be in order during Substantial Voting in this order of precedence:
  - (i) Point of Personal Privilege,
  - (ii) Point of Order,
  - (iii) Point of Parliamentary Inquiry,
  - (iv) Motion to Adapt by Acclamation,
  - (v) Motion to Divide the Question,
  - (vi) Motion to Vote on a Draft Resolution by Paragraphs, and
  - (vii) Motion to Divide the House.
- (2) At the beginning of Substantial Voting, the Chair shall declare the following provisions:
  - (a) The doors to be shut,
  - (b) No one being able to enter or leave the room (except with the Chairs' approval),
  - (c) The exchange of papers to be ceased,
  - (d) All electronic devices to be put out of reach/deactivated.

*(Rule 58) Methods of Voting*

- (1) The Committee/Council shall normally vote by show of placards.
- (2) A Delegate may move to adopt a Motion by Acclamation (see Rule 42) or move to Divide the House (see Rule 41).
- (3) Alternative Methods of Voting may be used at the discretion of the Chair. Those include:
  - (a) Vote by Voice:
 

The Chair may ask the question on the floor and then invite all those in favour to say "Aye" and all those opposing to say "No" sequentially. Then the Chair may declare the result accordingly by stating "The Ayes/Noes have it and the motion is carried/failed." This method is subject to objection by Delegates. If there are more than two objections, the Chair shall call the question again and perform a vote by show or placards. Delegates may object by rising to their feet and stating "Objection."
  - (b) Vote by Objection:
 

If the Chair deems there to be unanimity on a question on the floor, they may conduct a vote by stating the question and then announcing "Taken no objections, this Motion is carried." When there are objections taken, the Chairs shall repeat the vote and conduct another method of voting. Delegates may object by rising to their feet and stating "Objection."

*(Rule 59) Order of Voting on Draft Resolutions*

- (1) If there is more than one Draft Resolution under consideration for the same issue on the agenda, the Committee/Council shall be voting upon them in the order of submission. If one Draft Resolution passes, the other Draft Resolutions are automatically discarded.

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*(Rule 52) Friendly Amendments*

- (1) An Amendment is considered a Friendly Amendment, if it seeks to not change the substance of the Draft Resolution but rather spelling or other obvious mistakes and has the approval of the Sponsors of the Draft Resolution and the Chairs.
- (2) After its approval, the Delegates shall be informed about the changes introduced by the Friendly Amendment.

*(Rule 53) Re-introduction of Draft Resolutions and Amendments*

- (1) Draft Resolutions and Amendments that Previously Failed to Pass may be reintroduced by a Motion to Rescind.
- (2) This Motion is debatable to the extent of two Speakers against that Motion, and requires a two-thirds majority to pass.

**Chapter 9: Rules Regarding Voting**

*(Rule 54) Procedural Voting*

- (1) All voting procedures not mentioned as Substantive Voting in Rule 55 is considered Procedural Voting.
- (2) Delegates may not abstain from voting on matters of Procedural Voting.
- (3) If not all present Delegates vote either "Aye" (in favour) or "No" (against), the voting shall be declared inconclusive by the Chairs and shall be repeated until all Delegates cast valid votes.

*(Rule 55) Substantive Voting*

- (1) All voting on Draft Resolutions and Amendments is considered Substantive Voting.
- (2) Delegates, declared 'Present' in Roll Call (see Rule 13), may abstain in Substantive Voting.
- (3) Votes of Accredited Observers shall not be counted but those Observers may indicate their opinion by raising their placard in voting.
- (4) Substantive Voting fails to be valid, when there are more abstentions than votes in favour of and against the matter under consideration in total. In this case, the voting procedure shall be repeated. When this again yields an invalid result, the matter under consideration fails to pass automatically.
- (5) Upon passage of a matter under Substantive Voting, clapping shall be declared to be in order. When a question under Substantive Voting should be resolved in the negative, clapping shall not be in order. The Chairs may sanction misbehaviour in accordance with Rule 61.

*(Rule 56) Voting Rights*

- (1) Each Member of a Committee/Council shall have one vote in that Committee/Council.
- (2) Unless otherwise provided by these Rules of Procedure, all votes require a simple majority to pass.
- (3) A simple majority is reached if the number of those voting in the affirmative exceeds those voting in the negative.
- (4) A two-thirds majority is reached if at least two-thirds of all present Delegates cast their vote in the affirmative.

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**Chapter 10: Other Provisions**

*(Rule 60) Deviating Provisions in the Security Council*

- (1) Invitation to the Security Council
 

The Security Council may invite Members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence. Such requests shall be presented to the Committee Chairs/Presidents in writing. The Chairs shall then decide on whether to forward this request to the Secretariat or not at their discretion.
- (2) Voting in the Security Council
  - (a) The Security Council decides on procedural matters by the affirmative vote of nine Members.
  - (b) Decisions on all other matters shall be made by the affirmative vote of nine Members including the concurring votes of the permanent Members. If any of the five permanent Members casts a negative vote on a substantial matter that otherwise would have been passed, this issue shall be considered vetoed and therefore failed to pass.
- (3) Voting in the Security Council
  - (a) The Security Council decides on procedural matters by the affirmative vote of nine Members.
  - (b) Decisions on all other matters shall be made by the affirmative vote of nine Members including the concurring votes of at least four of the seven collective veto powers. If four or more of those collective veto powers cast a negative vote on a substantial matter that otherwise would have been passed, this issue shall be considered vetoed and therefore failed to pass.
  - (c) Those collective veto powers shall permanently include:
    - (i) The People's Republic of China,
    - (ii) The European Seat (represented by the governments of The French Republic, The Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland),
    - (iii) India,
    - (iv) The Nordic Seat (represented by the governments of The Kingdom of Denmark, The Republic of Finland, Iceland, The Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, The Åland Islands, Greenland, and The Faroe Islands),
    - (v) The Russian Federation, and
    - (vi) The United States of America.
  - (d) There shall be another collective veto power. This state shall be the so-called Tie Breaker and it shall be elected for a term of two years by the majority of the other members of the Security Council in a procedural vote. There shall be no limitation on the overall number of consecutive terms of office for a state as long as its candidacy is supported by the majority of members of the Security Council.

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**(Rule 61) Methods of Maintaining Order in Session and Sanctioning Misconduct**

**(1) Slight Misbehaviour by Members:**

When recognising a slight breach of these Rules of Procedure, the Chairs shall make the respective Member(s) aware of this fact and ask them to correct their misbehaviour. Therefore, the Chair may interrupt the current speaker.

**(2) Calling the Committee/Council/a Member to Order:**

Noting a more serious or repeated violation of the Rules of Procedure that substantially hinder productive debate, the Chairs may call a Member of the Committee/Council or even the whole Committee/Council itself to order. In doing so, the Chair shall rise to their feet and (if having access to such a device) tap the gavel multiple times. They may also call "Order" out loud. If the Chair calls a person or Committee/Council to order, the addressed Member(s) must take their seats and remain in silence. The Chair may address the Member(s) and explain the substance of the violation. The Chair may also decide whether the interrupted Speaker shall have their speaking time paused and later resumed or elapsed immediately.

**(3) Naming the Member/Delegate/Delegation:**


By naming a Member/Delegate/Delegation the Chair moves to temporarily exclude a Member of the Committee/Council due to utter misbehaviour substantially and repeatedly interrupting debates in session. The exclusion from debate can be for a duration of up to thirty minutes. If this motion is being carried, the named Member(s) may not participate in formal debate, moderated caucus, submit working papers or draft resolutions as main sponsor, and submit points or motions except for Points of Order, Points of Parliamentary Inquiry, and Points of Personal Privilege. The named Member(s) shall remain in the room of meeting. When naming a Participant/Delegation, the Chair shall define the time of exclusion. This motion is not debatable and requires a single majority to pass.

**(Annex I) Summary of Points and Motions and their Main Characteristics**

Name	Debate	Decision	Description	Rule
<b>POINTS</b>				
Point of Personal Privilege	N	Chair	To correct issues leading to personal discomfort, e.g. need to use the restroom	21
Point of Order	N	Chair	To correct a possible misuse/breach of the Rules of Procedure	22
Point of Parliamentary Inquiry	N	Chair	To ask questions on the Rules of Procedure	23
Right of Reply	N	Chair	To raise awareness to the previous Speaker insulting another Delegate	24
Point of Information to the Delegate	N	Chair	To ask a question regarding content to the previous Speaker in Formal Debate	25
<b>MOTIONS (IN DEBATE)</b>				
Motion to Follow-Up	N	Chair	To (after asking a question to the Speaker) have the chance to ask to clarify their answer	28
Motion for a Minute of Silent Prayer/Meditation	N	Chair	To formally request a Minute of Silent Prayer or Meditation due to grief in case of tragedy; Mover need not specify a reason for moving this Motion	29
Motion to Appeal the Decision of the Chair	N	2/3 maj	To ask the Chair to reconsider their previous ruling/decision	30
Motion to Suspend the Meeting	N	maj	To formally pause the meeting for a pre-determined amount of time (e.g. lunch)	31
Motion to Extend/Limit the Individual Speaker's Time	Y (1/1)	maj	To limit or extend the amount of time every individual speaker can speak for in Debate	32
Motion to Suspend Formal Debate	Y (1/1)	maj	To pause Formal Debate for a(n) (Un-) Moderated Caucus	33
Motion to Set the Agenda	Y (2/2)	maj	To set the Agenda as proposed; only in the first session of the Committee/Council	34
Motion to Adjourn the Meeting	N	maj	To formally end the Committee's/Council's work in the end of the last session	35
Motion to Adjourn/Resume the Debate	Y (2/2)	maj	To pause Debate on one issue on the Agenda and to open Debate on the other	36
Motion to Rescind	Y	2/3 maj	To re-open Debate on something that has been debated previously; see Rule 53	37
Motion to Amend the Draft Resolution	Y	maj	To change (amend) the text of a Draft Resolution; see Rule 50	38
Motion to Call the Previous Question	Y (2/2)	maj	To end Debate on the issue under consideration and start voting upon it	39
Motion to Close/Re-Open the List of Speakers	N	maj	To formally close the List of Speakers in Formal Debate; does not influence those already on the list	40
<b>MOTIONS (IN VOTING)</b>				
Motion to Adapt by Acclamation	N	maj	To not vote upon the issue under consideration and simply adapt it	41
Motion to Divide the Question	N	maj	To split the matter into smaller sub-units to vote upon them separately	42
Motion to Vote on a Draft Resolution by Paragraphs	Y (1/1)	maj	To vote upon each Operative Clause of a Draft Resolution separately	43
Motion to Divide the House	N	Must apply	To vote upon a matter by roll call not by show of placards	44

N = no debate / Y(v/x) = debate to the extend of x Speakers in favour and x Speakers against / maj = (simple) majority

**(Annex II) Flow Chart of Procedure in Formal Debate**



**(Annex III) Phrases for PCs and OCs in Resolutions**

(Only those phrases mentioned here are to be used in Resolutions for UNchanged)

**Preambulatory Clauses:**

Affirming	Deeply disturbed	Having considered	Observing
Alarmed by	Deeply regretting	Having examined	Reaffirming
Approving	Desiring	Having received	Realising
Bearing in mind	Emphasising	Having regard	Recalling
Believing	Expecting	Keeping in mind	Recognising
Confident	Expressing its appreciation	Mindful	Referring
Considering	Fulfilling	Noting (at the same time)	Seeking
Contemplating	Fully aware	Noting with deep concern	Taking into consideration
Convinced	Further developing	Noting with satisfaction	Taking note
Declaring	Further recalling	Noting further	Viewing with appreciation
Deeply concerned	Guided by		Welcoming
Deeply conscious	Having adopted		
Deeply convinced			

**Operative Clauses:**

Accepts	Declares (accordingly)	Expresses its/the concern	Recalls
Accepts with (deep) appreciation	Declares that	Expresses its/the confidence	Recognises
Accepts with gratitude	Deplores	Expresses its/the gratitude	Recommends that
Acknowledges	Designates	Expresses its/the hope	Rejects
Adopts	Dissolves the Committee	Expresses its/the solidarity with	Reminds the States/parties
Affirms	Draws the attention of	Firmly supports the people	Requests
Agrees with the observations	Emphasises	Further invites	Resolves
Appeals to all States	Empowers the Mediator	Further proclaims	Solemnly adopts
Appoints	Encourages	Further recommends	Stresses
Approves	Endorses the urgent appeal	Insists that	Suggests that
Authorises	Entrusts the Committee	Instructs the Committee	Supports the effort
Believes that	Envisages	Invites	Takes note of the observation
Calls attention to	Establishes a special fund	Makes an urgent appeal to	Takes note of the report
Calls the attention of	Establishes a target of	Notes that	Trusts that
Calls upon Member States	Exhorts all Member States to	Proposes	Underlines
Condemns	Expresses its/the appreciation	Reaffirms	Urgently requests the Committee
Confirms		Reasserts	Urges all States
Congratulates			Welcomes
Considers			



Ottoman sovereignty and the southern regions under continued British rule which around 1968 should develop into the two separate and sovereign states of North Yemen and South Yemen. In 1990, the governments of both nations came to an agreement of unification and a system of shared powers in the then newly established Yemen as we know it in recent times. After an arising conflict with its neighbour and significant actors in the international community over the invasion of Kuwait and following food shortages, a civil war broke out majorly along the lines of previous supporters of each North Yemen and South Yemen and their subsequent former rulers. The conflict which still devastates Yemen today was born.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, the ethnic mark-up of the country is a vital precondition for the conflict which started in the early 1990s. A most significant share of the Yemeni population is of Muslim faith, which according to the CIA World Factbook makes up for 99.1% of the entire country's permanent population.<sup>6</sup> The other 0.9% is a collective of Jewish, Hindu, and Christian faiths and are expected to be predominantly made up of non-permanent residents and refugees hosted by Yemen.<sup>7</sup> But more important than the split between Muslim and Non-Muslim population is the division amongst different branches of the Muslim faith. In Yemen, it is to be expected that of the 99.1% of the overall Muslim population 65% belong to the Sunni Islam and 35% follow their beliefs in the Shia Islam.<sup>8</sup> This situation significantly drives the division of the country's population and fuels the conflict both domestically as well as internationally, which leads us to the last historic precondition we would like to briefly raise your attention to: The Saudi Arabia-Iran Relations.

As the region's two most influential powers, both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran seek strategic advantages and political influence in the 'Muslim World'. They both have a pronounced interest in the group of actors in Yemen of the branch of Muslim faith they predominantly perform to win notable hold on the country under contestation. Therefore, Iran supports the Shia Houthi Groups and a coalition led by Saudi Arabia supports the Sunni Hadi government of Yemen. They both supply their supported side in conflict with weapons and other strategically important means and have a noteworthy interest in keeping the fight of the Houthi Groups versus the Hadi Government for domestic governmental power on until the very end of it no matter what the costs for civilian parties may be.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Whole paragraph: BBC, *Country Profile: Yemen – Timeline* [online], 18 February 2019, <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951>>, accessed 21 March 2019.

<sup>6</sup> Op. Cit. Central Intelligence Agency.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> TRT World, 'Yemen's complicated war explained' [video], 10 August 2018, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AkyXDDXzPyw>>, accessed 21 March 2019.

as but not limited to schools, hospitals, and funerals with the aim of weakening public support for the Houthi Group's aims.

In 2015, another group of international actors also entered into military efforts in Yemen: A group of western nations led by the United States of America and other members of the NATO sought campaigns against terrorist groupings in the north and east of Yemen. Additionally to these efforts, the USA also significantly support the Saudi Arabian campaigns with assistance in military training of their troops and enormous amounts of weaponry of all scales ranging from handheld firearms to Abrams Main Battle Tanks and F-15 Fighter Planes. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has become the U.S.'s biggest weapon buyer even ahead of Australia and all other European allies of the USA with authorised weapon sales worth around US\$ 22bn in 2015 and following years.<sup>10,11</sup>

The other side of this conflict in Yemen is the situation the civilian and non-combatant population faces due to the conflict. Beginning with the government's loss of control in 2014 and extending until today, crucial infrastructure has broken down and increased the suffering of the civilian population. This includes but is not limited to the failure of the provision of live-deciding health care, the breakaway of sewage systems, and the failure to dispose of litter properly which has increased the occurrence and speed of spreading of diseases. Those illnesses also include most predominantly an outbreak of Cholera in 2017 which saw almost 900,000 people affected and more than 2,100 people deceased. Due to a blockade around crucial harbours and airports in the regions controlled by the Houthi Groups, humanitarian aid cannot reach those suffering in a sufficient manner and scale. This issue will be raised specifically in this study guide later on as well.

At the end of 2017, activists of the Houthi Groups killed their former supporter and advocate Sallih and in January 2018 Separatist Groups with the support of the United Arab Emirates gained control over the harbour of Aden and parts of the south of Yemen which adds another actor to the already rather complex situation on Yemen.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the situation remains unchanged in recent years. Three to five different actors try to seize territorial control in bloody confrontations without big changes to the overall share of power and influence in Yemen. Efforts by the international community such as for example

<sup>10</sup> *The US may be aiding war crimes in Yemen* [video], Vox, 12 Dec. 2016.

<<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwP3SiBIC8>>, accessed: 25 March 2019, (2:20-2:30min).

<sup>11</sup> T. O'Connor, 'How Much Are U.S. Weapons Sales To Saudi Arabia? Donald Trump's Figures And Family Ties Challenged' [online], 12 Oct. 2018, <<https://www.newsweek.com/how-much-us-weapons-sales-saudi-arabia-trump-1167693>>, accessed: 26 March 2019.

<sup>12</sup> All parts on historic events: Op. Cit. BBC, *Country Profile: Yemen – Timeline* [online].

## History of Specific Events in Advance of the Conflict

Having covered the pre-conditions and having 'dipped' into contemporary history of Yemen already, we will now turn to a list of historical events leading up to the conflict as we observe it today (sparing you a repetition of the region's past before the unification of the two Yemeni nations).

Ever since the country's unification, there have been movements clashing over the existence of the benefits of the unification of Yemen which rose to a full-scale civil war in the early 1990s. This led to the creation of the so-called HOUTH GROUPS which sought more significant Shia representation in the (in their point of view too strongly Sunni influenced) SALLEH GOVERNMENT. As this conflict flamed up in the effect of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Houthi Groups gain stronger public support in the cities of the country's south and noteworthy succeed in rallying against the claimed corrupt government of Abdullah Sallih. One year later, President Sallih was substituted by Abd-Rabbu Mansour HADI which still is widely seen as President of Yemen. In response to the civil uprisings in Yemen, the UN sought efforts to solve the critical situation of confrontation over Yemen's future in form of a panel including all significant leaders of that time such as Hadi, Sallih, and Houthi. The outcome of these efforts was a plan to separate Yemen into six federal regions which was later violently rejected by the Houthi Groups.

Beginning in 2012 and finding its climax in 2014, the Hadi Government lost control over Yemeni territory to Houthi Groups in the country's south and west, and to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and DAESH seizing momentum and chance for control established in a power vacuum in the northern and eastern regions of Yemen. In February 2015, Houthi Groups gained control over Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, and forced President Hadi into exile first to Aden and later to Saudi Arabia.

These events focussed the international community's attention on the region which showed an effect in the formation of an Alliance of African and Middle Eastern nations under Saudi Arabian leadership seeking to re-instate Hadi's governance in Yemen in order to limit Shia influence directly on Saudi Arabia's doorstep. Numerous military interventions, most significantly campaign by air, followed and not exclusively affected the militant terrorist groups of Al-Qaeda and DAESH or the Houthi Groups but also the civilian population in the Houthi controlled regions. In a study of the UN, it is elaborated that an estimated 30% of airstrikes as part of the Alliance's Operation 'Decisive Storm' intentionally targeted non-military zones such

the Stockholm Peace Talks are only adhered to their outcomes very slowly and reluctantly by all sides of the conflict and a stalemate in institutions such as the UN Security Council and outside actors seeking geostrategic advances paralyse further proceedings.

## Actors

### The Yemeni Exile Government

The Yemeni exile government consists of President al-Hadi and ministers who remained loyal to him. In 2014, during the September 21 Revolution, the coup d'état staged by the Houthi Rebels, the exile government was forced to flee and is currently residing in the coastal city of Aden. President Hadi is the sole elected leader of the country and its government is currently the only internationally recognized governmental entity. In a conquest to regain power and the monopoly of force within the country, he called upon outside interference and aid in his conquest, especially upon the Saudi-led coalition.<sup>13</sup>

### The Houthi militia force

The Houthi military force is currently the second armed combatant group on the ground in Yemen. The revivalist Zaidi Shi'a movement emerged out of Yemen's far north and they initially fought for the control over the Saada area. During the political turmoil of the Arab Spring in 2011 they expanded their field of influence and power, and rapidly gained control over the Saada area. Continuing, in 2014 they seized Yemen's capital Saana and further enlarged their control to the southern areas and provinces of Yemen. The Houthi Rebel forces still control the major port city of Hodeidah and access to the Red Sea, which both are of major economic importance to the control over Yemen.<sup>14</sup> The Houthis intrinsic motivation is not the historic religious grievance, they are supposed to possess, but rather their main motives have become economic and political in nature, saying that their quest for power is not driven by the wish to install an imamate in Yemen, but rather to propagate a more anti-establishment populist message in order to secure autonomy from the currently internationally recognized government.<sup>15</sup> They sided with troops loyal to former President Salah, to form "an alliance of convenience that was a formidable opponent to President Hadi and his allies"<sup>16</sup>. The Houthi

13 J.M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.

14 A. Baron, 'Mapping the Yemen Conflict', Mapping the Yemen Conflict [website].

<<https://www.ecfi.eu/mena/yemen/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

15 Al Jazeera, 'Key facts about the war in Yemen', Al Jazeera, Yemen, 25 March 2018, <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

16 J.M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.

militia force receives support and backing from supposedly Iran through armament shipments, military training and exercise and intelligence support. Furthermore, indirectly through the Russian Federation within the United Nations Security Council, as they continuously veto any resolution concerning possible violations of international law and/or brokered peace agreements enacted by the Houthi rebel forces. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen criticized the Houthi Rebel force for failing the negotiations for a possible peace arrangement, by not being willing to make any substantial, strategic security arrangements or compromises. He has called it the "major obstacle" to peace within the Yemeni conflict<sup>17</sup>.

#### *Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*

Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula is a terrorist organization and a subbranch of Al-Qaeda and considered one of the most dangerous terrorist cells of the AL-Qaeda network. The political instability and turmoil within the country have provided a fertile breeding ground for these terrorist networks to expand their sphere of influence and effective control over unsolidified territories within Yemen. To this day AQAP holds effective control over parts of Shabwa and the Hadhramaut Governorate in Yemen. Additionally, the Yemeni branch of ISIL has seized the opportunity to establish themselves within Yemen and is operating training camps in the south and is occasionally claiming terrorist attacks within the region. They currently do not hold any effective territorial control within Yemen.<sup>18</sup> The emergence and influence of those terrorist groups is the main focal point of attack of the United States of America and is officially their primary reason for involvement in this particular conflict. The current presence of a power vacuum granting a fertile breeding ground for terrorist organizations continuous to be an enormous threat to not only regional but increasingly to international peace and security. This requires actions and direct and decisive answers from the international community.

#### *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*

After President Hadi and his governmental allies were forced to flee to Saudi Arabia and demanded international aid and Saudi Arabia rapidly assembled an international coalition against the Houthi Rebels and began aerial bombings, in the verge of an airstrike campaign the so-called "Operation Decisive Storm" and continuously called "Operation Restoring Hope".

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> A. Baron, 'Mapping the Yemen Conflict', Mapping the Yemen Conflict [website], <<https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

blamed the Iran government for violating the arms embargo. The Iran state-owned media outlet reported that the Revolutionary Guard Corps has ordered two air strikes on Saudi Arabian oil tankers, enacted by the Houthi rebel force. Tehran additionally, has not proved its readiness to de-escalate the conflict, but rather has provenly shown their willingness to escalate the conflict, by threatening to establish a blockade over oil shipping trading routes along its coastal border.<sup>20</sup>

#### *The United States of America*

The United States of America are currently involved in the Yemeni civil war in multiple ways. One being the provision of military and logistical advice to the Saudi-led coalition within Yemen. Their advice is only in a non-combatant role to forces which are combatting the Houthi rebel forces within Yemen. In 2018 after events related to the death of the journalist Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi within the Saudi Arabian embassy have questioned the liability and rationality of the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, the government of the USA halted armament sales to Saudi Arabia. Reason for that behavior was that the weapons sold are not being used in a strategically efficient way and could possibly worsen the humanitarian situation in Yemen and be used for violation of international law, in particular, international humanitarian law. Additionally, the US has established a "Joint Combined Planning Cell" in cooperation with the government of Saudi Arabia to coordinate air strikes and intelligence sharing.<sup>21</sup>

Secondly, the United States of America have expressed that any aggressive measure taken in an attempt at preventing the flow of energy-related resources from or to the Arabian Peninsula will be considered a grave violation of international law and a threat to regional peace and stability by the United States and will ultimately force an adequate response by the United States of America.<sup>22</sup>

Thirdly, the United States is engaged directly in combatting the presence of terrorist organizations within the territory of Yemen, to achieve the intended objective, to dismantle and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat, the United States of America closely cooperate with the Yemeni exile government and regional partners. This manifest itself in an air strike campaign aimed at targeting the terrorist organizations trying to use the political vacuum in the country. This drone-led air strike campaign has not been without controversy as multiple targets have

<sup>20</sup> J.M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> C.P. Cavas, 'US Navy beefs up Red Sea presence', Defense News, Naval, 11 February 2017, <<https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/index/2017/02/11/us-navy-beefs-up-red-sea-presence/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

These operations began as only airstrike campaigns, but have since expanded into naval blockades and the employment of ground forces into Yemen. The deployment of ground and special forces have been limited to some cross-border operations, the main focus still remains on the originally envisaged air strikes. Additionally, the Saudi-led coalition is providing advice and military support to pro-Hadi forces within Yemen. The official reasoning for the use of force within Yemen, given is the claim to the right self-defense under public international law. The Saudi Arabian officials repeatedly point to the continuous ballistic missile attacks of targets within the sovereign borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, committed by the Houthi rebel forces. Moreover, they have defended their actions by stating, that their actions were only limited to matters concerning their territorial integrity and the commerce within the Red Sea, which is of vital importance to the entire international community. However, the official reasoning given by the Saudi-Arabian officials has been questioned and it is often pointed out by scholars that another reasoning, is the prevention of growing Iranian influence throughout the Middle East. Yemen, in particular, sparks Saudi Arabian interests as the government wants to prevent an Iranian ally throughout the region, that is particularly close to Saudi Arabia. Their actions, however, have not remained unquestioned, as numerous reports hint towards violations of international law, partly because of the targeting of civilian infrastructure and killing thousands of Yemeni non-combatants, backed by reports and evaluations issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR)<sup>19</sup>.

#### *Islamic Republic of Iran*

With the so-called "middle-eastern cold war" continuing Iran has largely been a supporter of the Houthi Rebel forces within Yemen, unofficially aiming at broadening their political, economic and ideological sphere of influence throughout the Middle East. Iran along with the military force of Hezbollah, which has been an ally to Iran for the last decade, have provided the Houthi Rebel force with military advice & intelligence, funding and military training. Furthermore, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen in their confidential report has suggested that Iran continued to violate the international arms embargo, set out by the United Nations Security Council in their Resolution 2216, by continuing the armament supply and increasingly supplying advanced weaponry. These violations have reportedly been proven as two armament shipments have been intercepted by the Saudi-led coalition during their naval blockade in the Red Sea. Additionally, the Draft Resolution S/2018/156 additionally

<sup>19</sup> J.M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.

turned out to target innocent civilians, such as a wedding and mistakenly obliterated families. The administration has generally expressed regret, but have not altered their policies.<sup>23</sup>

Fourthly, the USA is the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to the region and through their humanitarian assistance program USAID. USAID has provided a total of \$721 million in humanitarian aid to Yemen and neighboring countries.<sup>24</sup> Lastly, the United States of America held that their involvement will continue to be limited to anti-terroristic campaigns and that there will be no direct involvement within the country of Yemen.

#### *The United Arab Emirates*

The United Arab Emirates are currently fighting in the southern provinces in support of the southern independence movement, in order to combat Al-Qaeda and Houthi forces seeking territorial gains. The Southern Independence which emerged in 2007, used the growing tension within the country and established effective control over large parts of the south, in order to strengthen their claim for independence or at minimum the implementation of federal divisions, which grant largely autonomous regions throughout Yemen. The UAE are currently controlling the port city of Aden in which the internationally recognized government is placed. However, the UAE has distanced itself from President Hadi and only have common interests in combatting Houthi rebels in the southern provinces. Additionally, they are training Yemeni fighters to combat terrorists and being able to establish an effective monopoly of force in the south.<sup>25</sup> Amnesty International and other NGOs have critically pointed towards apparent clandestine prisons in the South and cases of forced disappearances connected to the UAE presence within the southern region.<sup>26</sup>

#### *The Russian Federation*

The Russian Federation has not been actively involved in military terms in Yemen but has occasionally expressed their support for the Houthi Rebels as they are backed by a long-standing ally to Russia, namely Iran. The Russian Federation expressed its interests in the Middle-East by continuously holding that no solution to the conflict will be found unless the

<sup>23</sup> S.A. Cook, 'America is not an Innocent Bystander in Yemen', Voice, 27 September 2018, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/27/america-is-not-an-innocent-bystander-in-yemen/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

<sup>24</sup> USAID, 'Yemen', Latest Fact Sheet on Yemen [website], 26 February 2019, <<https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/yemen>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

<sup>25</sup> J.M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Amnesty International, 'Middle East North Africa', Yemen: UAE recklessly supplying militias with windfall of Western arms [website], 6 February 2019, <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/yemen-uae-recklessly-supplying-militias-with-windfall-of-western-arms/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

consent of all parties is achieved. The Russian Federation enacts its right to veto any draft resolution impeaching or condemning actions by their ally Iran or doesn't take into account its diffuse and special interests in the region. These interests mainly are of economic reasoning and at regaining its world power status in the modern globalized 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Subtopic 1: Peace

#### *Supporting the Establishment of Peace and the Protection of Non-combatants*

In the case of Yemen to find a suitable and sustainable solution for peace will first take a deep understanding of the complex and deep roots that sparked this conflict, additionally it will also need to involve all concerned and aforementioned actors in eventual peace-negotiations and peace-building measures. A way to peace in Yemen eventually will tangle along the three key parts the UN sets out as a roadmap for peace. Firstly peace-making, secondly peace-keeping and thirdly peace-building. In Yemen, we can find a fourth dimension which is so pressing it will require urgent action, the dire humanitarian situation of the Yemeni people, which should be of utmost importance to prevent the arising of future conflicts and the possible death of millions.<sup>27</sup>

The question that remains, is not who to blame, but should rather focus on how to tackle the four steps, how to engage all involved parties in the discussions and which focus and approach the international community should take to resolve the conflict. As, all four steps are seen as extremely controversial, the aspect of dialogue and mutual trust-building should be of primary focus to ease the tensions and reduce the hostilities between the parties. The brokered Stockholm Agreement can be seen as a first step towards peace-negotiations and additionally can be seen as an already established platform for negotiations.<sup>28</sup>

A brokered roadmap to peace has to already include conflict transformation, as well as already shed a light on the post-conflict phase, because an uneducated population and the hopelessness, which a major part of the population experience, will give a fertile breeding ground for extremist and future conflict escalation. Therefore, to avoid raising an uneducated and hopeless generation of young people it will be crucial for the international community to act swiftly and foresighted to prevent future breeding ground for conflict and re-emergence of

27 A. El Yaakoubi, M. Ghobari, 'Explainer: Is Yemen Finally On The Road To Peace' [online], 16 Dec. 2018, <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-politics-explainer/explainer-is-yemen-finally-on-the-road-to-peace-idUSKBN10F0KR>>, accessed 27 March 2019.  
28 United Nations, 'Amid Humanitarian Crisis, Yemen Advancing towards Peace as Ceasefire in Hodeidah, Key Ports Holds, Special Envoy Tells Security Council', *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases* [webpage], 9 January 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13659.doc.htm>, accessed 29 March 2019.

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The concept has been developed and published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the ICISS in their report introducing the Responsibility to Protect, set out multiple specific criteria on which a military intervention in the case of R2P must be based upon. Firstly, the intervention must be in response to a severe violation of international law and principles set forth by the R2P doctrine (Just Cause). Secondly, the primary goal of any operation has to be to end the acute suffering of humans (Right Intention). Thirdly, the use of force is only allowed after all other non-military measures have proven themselves to be unsuccessful and ineffective (Last Resort). Fourthly, the use of force has to be proportional in time, scope and intensity (Proportional means). Lastly, there has to be a reasonable prospect to success. These criteria, also apply to the wished upon and possible future establishment of an early warning system within states to further protect populations from mass atrocities.<sup>34</sup>

The Responsibility to Protect has been considered to be a large infringement on national sovereignty and therefore is highly contested by states, as the UN secretariat seemingly has already broadened the definitions given under Chapter VI/VII/VIII, which already limits states sovereignty and their behavior, as they are already expected to have some international responsibilities to the international community. As a result, the Responsibility to protect has no binding effect under international law and even though the Summit outcome document is a compromise and agreement of world leaders and has been put into practice by a multitude of states it cannot be considered even customary international law.<sup>35</sup>

### Subtopic 3: Harbours

#### *Promoting the Full and Sustained Opening of All Yemeni Sea- and Airports*

When one thinks about any means to ease the humanitarian situation of the civilian population of Yemen and to when times of reconciliation come reconstruction of the nation, infrastructure such as sea- and airports (hereafter: SAPs) are vital and indispensable.

With reconciliation being a feature of a rather distant future, we will focus on the humanitarian need for open SAPs. Basically, whenever aid is being dispensed in a region of need, infrastructure is of pivotal necessity for the undertaking. In the case of Yemen, in which the Houthi Group controlled areas are in need but the biggest land border of the country is

34 Op. Cit., Schaller.  
35 Ibid.

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the civil war. As the former UN special envoy to Yemen Ould Cheikh Ahmed held: "These steps are based on three pillars: the re-establishment of the agreement of the cessation of hostilities, re-building confidence measures and the return to the negotiating table with a view to reaching a comprehensive peace agreement"<sup>29</sup>.

### Subtopic 2: R2P

#### *The Question of the Applicability of Responsibility to Protect*

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a commitment by all Member States of the United Nations to end the worst forms of violence and persecution. R2P was created in response to the UN's failure to respond to the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan was a driving force in the development of the principle by appealing to Member States to "find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter and acting in defence of common humanity". R2P was adopted at the 2005 World Summit and is contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its outcome document. It is an evolution from the principles of the UN Charter, which primarily focused on the maintenance of security.<sup>30</sup>

R2P is built upon the commitment and responsibility of every individual nation to "protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (§138)<sup>31</sup>. Additionally, in §139, it infers a responsibility upon the international community to "use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN] Charter"<sup>32</sup> to protect populations from the above-mentioned mass atrocities. Should those means prove themselves to be inadequate and the concerned state continue to fail or be unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect, the international community shall take actions through the Security Council, in cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate and in accordance with the UN Charta.<sup>33</sup>

29 Yan, 'UN envoy proposes new road map to end Yemen's war', *Xinhua*, World, 26 October 2017, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/26/c\\_136706016.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/26/c_136706016.htm), accessed 29 March 2019.

30 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, "About Responsibility to Protect", United Nations, Accessed on 20 March 2018. <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html>

31 C. Schaller, 'Gibt es eine "Responsibility to Protect"?' *Politik und Zeitgeschichte* [online journal], APUZ 46, 2008, <<http://www.bpb.de/apuz/30862/gibt-es-eine-responsibility-to-protect?p=7>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

32 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document', Responsibility to Protect [website].

33 <<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2p-topics/398-general-assembly-r2p-excerpt-from-outcome-document>>, accessed 25 March 2019.

33 Ibid.

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shared with the political opponents of that same movement and the other borders are coastlines, the openness of SAPs is of highest importance and therefore has been and still is central to discourse. Physical means of humanitarian aid from international actors can only arrive in the country through those SAPs.

In the past through Resolutions such as S/RES/2452 (2019) and the reaching of the so-called Hodeidah and Ports Agreement (UNMHA), the parties to this conflict through continued efforts of the UN have caused progress but the means are still not adhered to sufficiently.<sup>36</sup> It is claimed that these agreements either are too ambitious as to the definition of time to implement them (14 days for the UNMHA) or are too weak to really lead to change (the Ta'izz Arrangement).<sup>37</sup>

With the southern regions of Yemen claimed by separatists supported by the UAE, the bottleneck of and the lifeline to humanitarian aid for the inhabitants of Houthi controlled regions are the seaports of Hodeidah and Saleef and the airports of the capital Sana'a, Hodeidah, Saleef, Ta'izz, Sa'dah, and Abbs.<sup>38</sup> These locations are often the focus of air raids by coalition forces and are often placed on which most military force and the fighting are focussed. The UN took it as one of their prime priorities to establish immediate and sustainable opening of those SAPs but their actions are not as effective as they could/should be. Whereas the UN under its UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) established a mostly reliable procedure to check that arriving goods are limited to humanitarian aid only, it remains unclear who should take care of keeping them open to and safe for arriving humanitarian aid. Neither the UN nor the Houthi Groups are able to fulfil that assignment on a continual basis and international forces are in a stalemate on who should do it which keeps the openness of those SAPs very fragile.

### UN Action

#### *Security Council Resolutions:*

S/RES/2456:

- Reaffirming the Panel of Expert travel and financial ban sanctions, arms embargo

S/RES/2452

36 O. Al-Rawhani, 'The good and the bad in the new peace agreement on Yemen' [online], 19 Dec. 2018, <<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/good-bad-peace-agreement-yemen-18121808222574.html>>, accessed: 23 March 2019.

37 Ibid.

38 <https://yemen.liveuamap.com/en/>

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- UN Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA)
- S/RES/2451
- Establish and deploy for an initial 30 days period a team to monitor and facilitate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement

#### Presidential Statements

S/PRST/2018/5  
S/PRST/2017/14

#### Panel of Experts Documents

S/2019/83 → Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen  
S/2018/1125 → Report of the Yemen Sanctions Committee

#### Human Rights Council Documents

A/HRC/39/43 → Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts

#### Failed Draft Resolution:

S/2018/156 → based upon the findings of the Yemen Panel of Experts' findings that Iran was in non-compliance with the Arms Embargo

#### Stockholm Agreement

An agreement reached between Houthis Rebels and the internationally recognised government, within Stockholm on the 13.12.2018 which represents only a bare minimum of measures that need to be taken to resolve and better the current situation of the Yemeni people. The agreement consists of four key elements.

4 key elements:

1. Prisoners swap
2. Creation of a demilitarized zone around the country's vital Red Sea trade corridor through a series of withdrawals by rival Yemeni forces
3. Formation of a committee to discuss the future of the contested city of Taiz
4. A commitment of Houthis and the government to reconvene at the end of December

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#### Amnesty International

"Gross human rights violations, including what could amount to war crimes, were committed and continue throughout the country to this day. Civilians are trapped in the middle."<sup>42</sup>

"Imprecise weapons are used on daily basis in residential areas, causing civilian casualties such indiscriminate attack violates the laws of war."<sup>43</sup>

#### Further Sources for Research

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/> (UN documents on Yemen)  
UNSC/RES/2452 (2019)  
<https://undocs.org/S/2018/1134> (Stockholm Agreement/Hodeidah and Ports Agreement [UNMHA])  
<http://www.nepia.com/insights/industry-news/yemen-port-situation-starupdatestar/> (Recent situation of openness of seaports)  
[http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005\(1\).pdf](http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005(1).pdf)  
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<sup>42</sup> Amnesty International, 'Yemen, Armed Conflict', *Yemen War: No end in sight* [website], 14 March 2019, <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.  
<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

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The Stockholm Agreement in totality represents a possibility to serve as a stepping Stone for future negotiations and possible diplomatic peace-dialogues. For future negotiations it will be crucial to review and assess the upholding of the above-mentioned elements. This particular agreement, gives an opportunity to the UN to exercise leverage and pressure on all parties in Yemen to upholding the peaceful conduct of diplomatic relations. Additionally, it also grants the possibility to establish a demilitarized zone within Yemen.<sup>39</sup>

#### UN Documents for Yemen

Go to:

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/>

#### UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM)

A verification and inspection mechanism has started operating in May 2016 to assist in validating commercial sea and air traffic in support of the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 2216. It is considered an U.N. led operation designed to inspect incoming sea cargo to Yemen for illicit weapons. They are allowed to inspect cargo and are tasked with ensuring that humanitarian aid is delivered in time.<sup>40</sup>

#### UN Documents for Yemen

Go to:

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/>

#### Other Voices

##### Gulf Cooperation Council

"The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has backed Yemen President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi in rejecting the formation of a transitional political council in southern Yemen, saying that calls for the separation of southern Yemen should be ignored."<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> P. Salisbury, 'What does the Stockholm agreement mean for Yemen', *The Washington Post, Analysis*, 21 December 2018, <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/21/what-does-the-stockholm-agreement-mean-for-yemen/>>, accessed 25 March 2019.  
<sup>40</sup> J.M. Sharp, *Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention*, CRS Report R49360, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 2017.  
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## V. Outcome Documents

UNchanged S/RES/2468 (2019)

### P-5 UN Security Council

Distr.: General  
28 April 2019

#### Resolution 2468 (2019)

**Sponsors:** Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

**Signatories:** Argentine Republic, Republic of Poland, Republic of Uganda, Republic of Costa Rica

*The Security Council,*

*Noting with deep concern* that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to regional and international peace and security,

*Fully aware* of the responsibility for the Yemeni people we as the international community have,

*Alarmed* by the looming humanitarian catastrophe, especially in the Houthi controlled parts of Yemen, which is partly caused by the rapid spread of preventable diseases, such as Cholera,

*Bearing in mind* the danger connected to any presence or direct involvement in the conflict areas for the military personnel deployed as well as the population of the respective areas,

*Seeking* short-term as well as long-term humanitarian aid measures,

*Deeply regretting* the lack of trust between the negotiating parties,

*Deeply concerned* that ruthless terroristic associations are still controlling large areas of the Yemeni territory,

*Reaffirms* its resolutions 2368 and 2462 with respect to Yemen specifically, and *condemns* all United Nations designated terrorist groups with zero tolerance for their activities in Yemen, by means of cooperation,

*Firmly supports* the immediate ceasefire agreed upon in the Agreement on the city of Hudaydah,

*Recalling* S/RES/2452(2019);

**1. Acknowledges** that security is not only measured by the height of defense budgets, but in the case of Yemen requires extensive humanitarian action, in addition to other peace restoring measures, to restore international peace and security by helping to stabilize the country and the region, and furthermore work as a terrorism preventing measure;

**2. Calls upon member states** in the possession of unarmed long-range high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles to provide a sufficient number of them, including qualified staff, to a UN-coordinated and -funded project starting as soon as possible, tasked with the dropping of aid kits with medicine and vaccines against Cholera and other dangerous diseases on the Houthi-controlled areas, which are un-accessible with the currently used regular aid delivering planes, to build the trust necessary to send more extensive humanitarian aid and continue peace negotiations, and emphasizes that this is a short term solution to build trust and remedy immediate grievances as effectively as we can, and only in the areas un-accessible with conventional airplanes, after which we will continue the provision of aid with different, extended measures;

**3. Welcomes** the leading mediator role of the United Nations; and **emphasises** the importance that the parties involved shall remain committed to continue the peace talks open which will lead to lasting peace and stability in Yemen;

**4. Underlines** that the UNHAS Flight Schedule should and may be extended to achieve a sufficient and feasible daily provision of medical supplies and vital basic food supplies for the Yemeni population;

**5. Welcomes** the suspension of the naval blockade for the single purpose for the time being of allowing the access of humanitarian aid and tasking in collaboration with the neutral countries China, Poland and Argentina a UN special envoy whose tasks shall include:

- i. Monitoring the naval sea specifically to prevent military reinforcements,
- ii. Submitting weekly reports on the evaluation and findings to the UN Security Council,
- iii. Assuring the neutrality of the aid assistance, guaranteeing the procurement of the aid to all needed parties;

**6. Endorses the urgent appeal** to implement the demilitarised zone around the harbour of Hudaydah as it was already agreed upon in the Stockholm Agreement;

**7. Empowers** the Redeployment Coordination Committee chaired by the United Nations to oversee the ceasefire and the redeployment of all military forces from the port of Hudaydah;

**8. Makes an urgent appeal to** the negotiating parties of the recent peace negotiations to conduct all prisoner exchanges agreed upon therein, and furthermore maintain open communication channels for the coordination of further prisoner exchanges as a trust-building measure vital for the success of past and future agreements between the parties to the conflict;

**9. Reminds the States** of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Strengthen the Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Yemen, which prioritizes the lives of the Yemeni children, who are one of the most vulnerable victims of the humanitarian crisis, and to ensure the full implementation of the MOU to protect the children

from armed conflicts, and to make certain that all Yemeni boys' and girls' peaceful future is sustained;

**10. Calls upon member states** involved directly or indirectly in the conflict to immediately come into compliance with international humanitarian law, or ensure that the parties to the conflict which they are supporting do so as fast as possible, additionally informing them about the requirements of international humanitarian law if necessary;

**11. Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNchanged

S/RES/2468 (2019)

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## CP-7 UN Security Council

Distr.: General  
28 April 2019

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### Resolution 2468 (2019)

**Sponsors:** Republic of Costa Rica, United States of America

**Signatories:** Canada, Delegation of the European Seat, People's Republic of China, Republic of India, Republic of Singapore, United Arab Emirates

*The Security Council,*

*Recognizing* that the situation in Yemen must be considered a severe humanitarian crisis,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen,

*Recalling* its resolutions 2140 (2014), its renewal 2402 (2018), 2456 (2019), 2452 (2019), 2451 (2019), 2342 (2016), 2266 (2016), 2216 (2015), 2204 (2015), 2201 (2015), 2051 (2012), as well as the international arms embargo laid out in 2216 (2015),

*Declaring* that any policy intended or supported herein shall clearly pursue the objective of ending the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen,

*Believing* that the Stockholm Agreement (2018) and future peace agreements intended by this resolution are to be fully implemented to ensure an end to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen,

*Expressing* concern at the ongoing political, security, economic and humanitarian challenges in Yemen, including the ongoing violence, and threats arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of weapons,

*Deeply concerned* by the dramatic situation faced by especially vulnerable parts of the Yemeni society such as children, women, ill, injured and all other affected civilians,

*Reiterating* its call for all parties in Yemen to adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation,

*Bearing in mind* the definition of terrorism by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as "acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims",

*Fully aware* of the importance of decreasing the influence and power of terrorist groups recognized by the United Nations in Yemen in order to ensure short-term and long-term stability and security in the region, primarily by non-military means and always in accordance with UN peacekeeping principles and international law,

*Emphasizing* the need for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international maritime law as applicable,

*Gravely distressed* by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian situation in Yemen, *expressing serious concern* at all instances of hindrances to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, including limitations on the delivery of vital goods to the civilian population of Yemen,

*Further reminds* all member states of the United Nations Security Council to reaffirm their commitment to the internationally recognized government of president Hadi,

1. **Encourages** the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) to put emphasis on evaluating the state of the humanitarian crisis on a weekly basis and include it in its report to the United Nations Security Council;
2. **Further reminds** the parties of the international arms embargo defined in its Resolution 2210, stating that all member states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types to Yemen, and **condemns** any violation thereof;


3. **Urgently requests** the Government of Yemen and the Ansar Allah movement to make official statements regarding suggestions for possible changes towards the current Stockholm Agreement within one month after the resolution has been adopted and restate their commitment to the agreement and peace in Yemen;
  4. **Invites** the continuation of peace talks within two months after this resolution has been adopted with both the Government of Yemen and the Ansar Allah movement present, as well as other stakeholders, which should be based on the current Stockholm Agreement and should at least include the following provisions:
    - i. renewal of the ceasefire agreement with regard to technical details on the scope, nature and duration of the agreement, as well as the definition of breaches to the agreement,
    - ii. strong commitment to its binding nature,
    - iii. strict sanctions yielded in accordance with subclause ii and for not continuing peace talks within two months after this resolution has been adopted, which are to be further specified,
    - iv. conduct of research by the OSESGY in accordance with operative clause 9 in order to define mechanisms for quickly stopping fighting if it breaks out anew,
    - v. establish intelligence sharing by the parties of the Stockholm Agreement, as well as the member states providing military support to the parties according to the principles of peacekeeping intelligence as outlined by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) / Department of Field Support (DFS);
  5. **Appeals to all states** to increase volume and efficiency of humanitarian aid financed by inter alia the countries of the European Seat, the United States of America, Canada, People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Australia, as well as further countries willing to give financial aid under the condition that all parties prove to the OSESGY to implement security measures, such as, but not limited to:
    - i. securing cargo of humanitarian supplies through the Bab-el-Mandeb-strait, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in general, especially in Yemen's territorial waters,
    - ii. United Nations experts acting under the principles of United Nations peacekeeping,
    - iii. other non-governmental actors approved by the United Nations and the Government of Yemen;
  8. **Suggests** the freezing of financing of terrorist groups, currently recognized by United Nations, by the parties to the Stockholm agreement through inter alia the following measures:
    - i. tighten general cash controls with special attention to people entering or leaving Yemen with \$5,000 or more in cash,
    - ii. extend customs checks to cash sent in postal parcels or freight shipments and to precious commodities such as gold, as well as prepaid payment cards,
    - iii. freezing of bank accounts and consider further investment sanctions;
  9. **Invites** the OSESGY, in correspondence with the Panel of Experts, to research on the opportunity of deploying United Nations peacekeeping blue helmets, measures to protect civilians, as well as implementing other peacemaking measures and report to the United Nations Security Council within one month after the adoption of this resolution;
  10. **Reasserts** its commitment to actively secure the ongoing flow of resources along the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and through the Red Sea, also via patrols of member states militarily involved in the Yemen conflict on a short-term basis, while declaring that all forces are to be withdrawn after public order has been reinstalled;
  11. **Proposes** the establishment of an International Maritime Task Force for Yemen in partnership between the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the People's Republic of China to protect authorized commercial and private shipping in the territorial waters of Yemen and prevent the formation of pirate groups:
    - i. which shall have the mandate of taking measures approved by the United Nations Security Council to protect shipping, further defined upon the creation of such a Task Force,
    - ii. which shall be composed of all nations willing of participating in the context of a joint United Nations commission and command,
  - ii. securing unlimited access to the Red Sea Mills in the ports of Western Yemen, particularly Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa,
  - iii. securing the safety of civilian airports of Sana'a, Hodeidah, Salif, Ta'izz, Sa'dah, and Abbs, which are to be used to receive further humanitarian aid,
  - iv. enabling humanitarian workers and organizations, including but not limited to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to securely and successfully react on calls by the families and children,
  - v. stopping the use of and removing existing landmines with the consent of the Government of Yemen in order to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers and the local population of Yemen, as well as the safe passage and storing of humanitarian aid supplies,
  - vi. improving inspection of shipping containers via already existing United Nations missions such as but not limited to the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and providing the necessary financial resources accordingly,
  - vii. enhancing the cooperation with nationally and internationally recognized organizations, as well as the coordination among the major donors and giving due consideration to the OSESGY's assessment of the current situation in Yemen;
6. **Declares that** immediate humanitarian aid by every member state of the United Nations willing to provide aid shall specifically target the most vulnerable groups of society, and focus on securing the following dimensions:
    - i. food supply,
    - ii. medical supply,
    - iii. sanitation facilities,
    - iv. accommodation,
    - v. infrastructure necessary to provide humanitarian aid and ensuring a functioning health system,
    - vi. accessibility of safe drinking water;
  7. **Calls upon** the OSESGY to include the following parties during the evaluation of the proper access and distribution of immediate humanitarian aid:
    - i. local authorities,
    - iii. which shall be financed proportionally according to the commitment undertaken by its member states while orientating at the operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),
    - iv. which shall be established in the shortest time possible, and directly report to the United Nations Security Council,
    - v. whose mandate duration shall be defined by the United Nations Security Council taking into consideration the reports of the OSESGY;
  12. **Recognizes** the importance of consulting Yemeni civil actors and civil society organizations on issues concerning among others the present situation of Yemen, the peace process and the future of Yemen and further invites these actors to participate in dialogues conducted, hosted or supported by members of the international community on such and other related topics, further encourages all member states of the international community to initiate and support cooperations with non-governmental actors promoting civil relations between the corresponding country and Yemen;
  13. **Emphasizes** the necessity to hold elections after peace has been established in Yemen and makes an urgent appeal to the Government of Yemen to invite United Nations electoral assistance to the country in order to ensure that the elections are conducted in a fair and democratic manner;
  14. **Makes an urgent appeal to** increase support to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and establish the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Yemen to develop and rebuild the infrastructure and social structures with specific focus on inter alia: education, employment, healthcare, transportation, clean water, electricity, sanitation, infrastructure;
  15. **Stresses** the importance of implementing the SDG 16 "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels" in order to establish political stability in Yemen via the targets of the SDGs such as, but not limited to:
    - i. strengthening the judiciary system of Yemen,
    - ii. reducing corruption and bribery through increasing penalties,
    - iii. improving transparency of the government regarding laws and decisions passed, as well as the current distribution of budget,

- iv. improve representation in public institutions regarding the proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) to represent national distributions;
16. **Encourages** the member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League's Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) to draw their attention to Yemen in an effort to ensure economic stability in the country by such as, but not limited to:
- i. reducing trade obstacles regarding goods and services falling under the categories of operative clause 6,
  - ii. economically support multinational corporations doing business with Yemeni companies;
17. **Declares** to remain actively seized on the matter.

## VI. Participant Questionnaire


$N(P5 \text{ UNSC}) = 13 / N(C7 \text{ UNSC}) = 13$  (This applies to all of the following questions.)

Q1: I am able to identify interests and ideas of the country I represented in the final (draft) resolution. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)




Average: P5 UNSC = 7 / C7 UNSC = 7.3

Q2: Many interests and ideas of the country I represented were suppressed by a Permanent Member of the Security Council. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)




Average: P5 UNSC = 5.2 / C7 UNSC = 2.5

Q3: Many interests and ideas of the country I represented were suppressed by another actor other than a Permanent Member of the Security Council. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)




Average: P5 UNSC = 3.3 / C7 UNSC = 2.4

Q4: Possible alliances with Permanent Members of the Security Council significantly increased the chances of the interests and ideas of the country/countries I represented to be heard and included in the final (draft) resolution. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)




Average: P5 UNSC = 6.5 / C7 UNSC = 6,7

Q5: (Only answer if you were a Delegate in the reformed Security Council) The Tie Breaker (Costa Rica) was the most powerful actor in the Security Council. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)



Average: C7 UNSC = 4.6

Q6: In conclusion, the workings in the Security Council, I was a part of, were efficient and effective. (Is this statement true?) (1 = not at all / 10 = completely)



Average: P5 UNSC = 4.8 / C7 UNSC = 7.1

Comments:

- Argentine Republic (P5 UNSC): “Argentina is one of the members [...] which has the least or no bound to the situation [...]. Therefore, it was **not involved that much in the decision-making process** or their interests did not need to be represented. That is why there is no obvious blocking by a P5 member possible.”
- United Kingdom (P5 UNSC): “The topic was well chosen because it was very complex and we could talk about many aspects but in the other hand since it is so complex the **delegates will never have all the information to actually act realistically.**”
- Argentine Republic (C7 UNSC): “**Not including involved parties** like Saudi Arabia and Iran created a debate which was not very conflicting. Therefore, the new structure of the Council didn't really show as effects, as there weren't many points where a veto would have been issued. Also including many countries with a very weak or no opinion on the issue at all, lead to a discussion dominated by a few people.”
- Republic of India (C7 UNSC): “Unfortunately **some states missed**, so a veto was not a special right. As 9 votes were needed, sometimes two abstentions were already like a veto.”
- EU Seat (C7 UNSC): “Due to **time constraints** some issues/amendments (e.g. peacekeeping) were not able to be discussed and changed to be completely in adherence to international law/past resolutions [...]”
- United States of America (C7 UNSC): “Consideration of **African countries with permanent seat and veto power.**”
- Republic of Costa Rica (C7 UNSC): “**[I]n reality, delegates know more about the position of their country**, even if they are not participating in the conflict and the country has no official opinion.”
- Republic of Singapore (C7 UNSC): “[...] the fact that the entire **session was recorded** has prevented me from participating more actively.”



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